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Abstract
Arrow’s Theorem concerns a fundamental problem in social choice theory: given
the individual preferences of members of a group, how can they be aggregated to form
rational group preferences? Arrow showed that in an election between three or more
candidates, there are situations where any voting rule satisfying a small list of natural
“fairness” axioms must produce an apparently irrational intransitive outcome. Fur-
thermore, quantitative versions of Arrow’s Theorem in the literature show that when
voters choose rankings in an i.i.d. fashion, the outcome is intransitive with non-negligible
probability.
It is natural to ask if such a quantitative version of Arrow’s Theorem holds for
non-i.i.d. models. To answer this question, we study Arrow’s Theorem under a natural
non-i.i.d. model of voters inspired by canonical models in statistical physics; indeed, a
version of this model was previously introduced by Raffaelli and Marsili in the physics
literature. This model has a parameter, temperature, that prescribes the correlation
between different voters. We show that the behavior of Arrow’s Theorem in this model
undergoes a striking phase transition: in the entire high temperature regime of the
model, a Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem holds showing that the probability of paradox
for any voting rule satisfying the axioms is non-negligible; this is tight because the
probability of paradox under pairwise majority goes to zero when approaching the
critical temperature, and becomes exponentially small in the number of voters beyond
it. We prove this occurs in another natural model of correlated voters and conjecture
this phenomena is quite general.
1 Introduction
Arrow’s Theorem concerns a fundamental problem in social choice theory: given the in-
dividual preferences of members of a group, how can these preferences be aggregated to
form rational group preferences? This problem is often discussed in the context of voting,
where the goal is for society to choose between different candidates in an election based
upon the ranked preferences of individual voters. The underlying problem is considerably
more general and has also attracted renewed attention in computer science, see e.g. [26, 59]
– a key example outside of the classical voting context involves the aggregation of search
results from different experts [23, 13].
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Already in the 18th century, the Marquis de Condorcet [16] considered the problem of
aggregating votes and observed the following paradox: in majority-based pairwise elections
between three candidates A, B, and C it is possible that A beats B, B beats C, and C
beats A, so society’s preferences may be intransitive if they are determined by pairwise
majority elections. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [4, 5] shows that this phenomenon is
very general: there is no way to aggregate individual preferences in a way which guarantees
a transitive outcome (i.e. a consistent ranking of candidates) and satisfies Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Unanimity1 except for a “dictator” function which ignores
the preferences of all but a single person. In other words, for any aggregation scheme except
for dictator and satisfying IIA and Unanimity, there exists some setting of individual ranked
preferences such that the outcome of the election is intransitive.
The extent to which Arrow’s Theorem applies in practice has been debated extensively.
See e.g. [31, 42] where some real examples of the Condorcet paradox are noted, such as
cyclical voter preferences between three candidates for Prime Minister of Denmark. A major
question of concern is whether the situations where intransitivity occurs are atypical, i.e.
unlikely to occur in realistic scenarios. A priori, in an election with n voters and three
candidates Arrow’s Theorem only guarantees that one out of 6n possible voting profiles –
an exponentially small proportion – leads to intransitivity. This raises the following natural
question, studied in previous work: if we ignore a o(1) fraction of possible voter preferences,
does the conclusion of Arrow’s Theorem still hold?
Quantitative Versions of Arrow’s Theorem. A long line of work in quantitative
social choice theory has sought to answer this question, by studying the extent to which the
above stated guarantee for Arrow’s Theorem can be improved. One of the earliest works
along these lines was in 1952, when Guilbaud [33] analytically computed the asymptotic
proportion of voting profiles under which pairwise majority avoids the Condorcet paradox.
Guilbaud determined that for a three-candidate election, as the number of voters goes to
infinity, the answer is approximately 91.2%. Phrased in a more probabilistic language,
if all voters independently pick a uniformly random ordering of the candidates then the
probability of a Condorcet paradox occuring is over 8%. A number of works considered
related versions of this problem — see e.g. [10, 18] and several other references listed in
[42, 31].
The result of Guilbaud was restricted to pairwise majorities and so it was only a quan-
titative analogue of Condorcet’s result as opposed to the general Arrow’s Theorem. Using
tools from Fourier analysis on the hypercube, Kalai [39] (and a follow-up work of Keller
[40]) proved the first quantitative analogue of Arrow’s theorem under an assumption that
the aggregation rule is perfectly balanced. In other words, under this assumption Kalai
showed that any voting rule which satisfies IIA and is at least δ-far from any dictator must
admit an intransitive outcome with probability at least (δ) which is independent of n.
1IIA says that the aggregated relative order of A and B is a function only of individual preferences
between A and B (e.g. if society ranks A over B, an individual swapping the ranking of C vs. D does
not affect this). Unanimity is the condition that if all voters prefer A to B, then the aggregated preference
must also rank A over B. Unanimity rules out constitutions where one candidate always wins/loses; in the
statement of quantitative versions of Arrow’s Theorem, this assumption is dropped and the possibility of a
constant winner/loser is listed explicitly.
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Unfortunately, the techniques used in [39, 40] relied heavily on the balance assumption
that the probability one candidate beats another is exactly equal to 1/2, leaving open the
possibility that unbalanced constitutions could still avoid paradox with high probability.
Finally, Mossel [51] removed the assumption of balance and proved the desired quantitative
generalization of Arrow’s Theorem, making use of powerful analytic tools like reverse hy-
percontractivity [11] and the Invariance Principle [53]. In particular, ignoring o(1) fraction
of possible voter preferences cannot avoid the conclusion of Arrow’s Theorem.
Repeating the same proof with more general hypercontractive estimates in the work [52]
allowed to prove the appropriate quantitative analogue of Arrow’s Theorem in the setting
where voter preferences are still i.i.d., but can be sampled from an arbitrary distribution with
full support on the set of rankings. Some related lines of work in quantitative social choice
theory include quantitative versions of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [32,
60] on the manipulability of elections, see e.g. [29, 37, 54], and quantitative results for
judgement aggregation [55, 27].
On The Independence Assumption. The Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem discussed
above shows that when individuals choose their preferences uniformly at random and inde-
pendent of each other, any aggregation rule which satisfies IIA and is far from a dictator
is intransitive with positive probability independent of n. However, the assumption that
voters choose their preferences independently of others is somewhat problematic in real
voting scenarios (as mentioned in e.g. [52]). We know that individuals usually do not make
their choices in a vacuum but instead are influenced by their interactions with other people
— both directly with members of their immediate social circle and indirectly with others
through the internet, mass media, polling, etc. and it is has been suggested that such
mechanisms could reduce the probability of intransitive outcome in practice (see e.g. [42]).
To investigate this problem, we should modify our previous question and ask: if we allow
the distribution of votes between different individuals to be correlated, does the conclusion
of Arrow’s Theorem still hold if we can ignore a probability o(1) fraction of outcomes?
Unfortunately, in greatest possible generality this question is too broad; for example, if
we allow for voters to be so correlated that they all vote in exactly the same way there
is obviously no possibility of paradox and the problem of aggregation is not interesting.
Also, at a technical level the arguments used in the works [39, 40, 51] rely quite strongly on
techniques and results from discrete Fourier analysis over product measures, which made it
unclear if they could say anything about the case where voters interact.
Statistical Mechanics Models for Consensus Formation. What is a good model
of interacting voters? In a separate line of work, also inspired by Condorcet’s paradox
and Guilbaud’s asymptotic calculation, physicists studied group opinion formation from
a statistical mechanics perspective — see e.g. [30, 58, 14] and [31] for a discussion of
this work in the context of the broader social choice literature. Notably, Raffaelli and
Marsili [58] introduced a more complex model of voter interaction where voters both want
to agree with the majority consensus of society and have their own random preference. Using
heuristic methods, they described the phase diagram of their model and how to estimate the
probability of Condorcet paradox. This analysis is specific to pairwise majority elections, so
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it doesn’t give any analogue of Arrow’s Theorem or tell us what happens for other models
of elections (e.g. pairwise elections under an electoral college system).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we aim to prove best-of-both-worlds results: we es-
tablish versions of the full Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem under the more complex models
of voter interaction inspired by statistical mechanics. First, we study the same type of
(mean-field) interaction model as [58] and give a very precise (and rigorous) analysis of the
behavior of the general voting schemes in this model, in terms of the parameter β (referred
to as inverse temperature in the context of statistical mechanics). Our analysis reveals a
phase transition for the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem exactly at the critical temperature
(i.e. the natural phase transition point) of the model and shows as a byproduct that when-
ever pairwise majority elections suffer from a Ω(1) probability of paradox, this actually
extends to all voting rules which satisfy IIA, are not close to dictator, and do not fix the
winner or loser of any pairwise election. So pairwise majority is threshold-optimal in this
model.
We formulate a precise conjecture stating that this behavior holds in more general models
and give evidence for this by verifying the conjecture in a second model which otherwise
exhibits qualitatively different behavior. In this model, correlations are all local and the
model does not exhibit a phase transition at any temperature; accordingly, the Quantitative
Arrow’s Theorem we prove in this setting shows that the probability of paradox for any
constitution satisfying IIA is Ω(1) for all fixed β ≥ 0, unless the constitution is close to a
dictator or constant on a pairwise election.
1.1 Our Model
In this section we first describe a general family of models we consider for correlated voters,
which is closely related to both classical models of random permutations and fundamental
models of correlated spins from statistical physics, and then the two special cases we will
study in detail in this work. As mentioned before, the “mean-field” version is the same as
the interaction model in [58] and some additional justification for this model can be found
there.
Model on general graphs. LetSq denote the symmetric group (i.e. set of permutations)
on q elements, which corresponds to the possible individual voter preferences in an election
with q candidates. Let dτ denote the Kendall’s Tau distance between permutations, i.e.
dτ (pi1, pi2) is the total number of pairs (i, j) such that pi1(i), pi1(j) are in the opposite order
from pi2(i), pi2(j). The previous discussion motivates the definition of the following energy
function for a society of n voters which interact with neighbors on a graph
E(x) = 2
∑
i∼j
dτ (xi, xj)
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where the sum ranges over edges (i, j) in the graph, and consideration of the pairwise
graphical model (Markov Random Field) over voting profiles x ∈ Snq given by e−β
′E(x), i.e.
Pr(X = x) =
1
Z
exp
−2β′∑
i∼j
dτ (xi, xj)
 . (1)
where β′ ≥ 0 controls the strength of interactions and Z is a normalizing constant. Note
that in this model the marginal law of a single coordinate is uniform over Sq, however the
coordinates are no longer independent. Some justifications for this model:
1. Motivation: this reweights the uniform measure towards low-energy configurations so
that neighbors are less likely to disagree, which seems like a more plausible behavior
for voters who interact in a social network than if their votes are uncorrelated.
2. Connections to the Mallows model: the Mallows model under Kendall’s tau [48] is
probably the most popular and well-studied model of a distribution over permutations,
used in numerous fields including economics, psychometrics, and machine learning (see
e.g. [48, 20, 46]), and for which there has been a lot of recent progress in inference
and learning (see e.g. [12, 6, 45]). If we consider the general model above in the n = 2
case where the graph has a single edge, the conditional law of one spin given a fixing
of the other is exactly the Mallows model.
3. Connections to Ising models: the q = 2 case of this model is the Ising model on a
general graph, one of the most important models in statistical mechanics; this model
and variants have been successfully applied in numerous other contexts including
biology (e.g. [8]), image segmentation [44], machine learning (e.g. [34]), and dynamics
in social networks (e.g. [49, 47]). See also the discussion in [58].
4. Maximum entropy principle: This is the maximum entropy distribution among all dis-
tributions P achieving the same value of EP [
∑
i∼j dτ (Xi, Xj)]; in statistical mechanics
and Bayesian statistics, taking the maximum-entropy distribution given observed con-
straints is generally considered to be the most natural choice of model (see Jaynes’s
principle [38]).
We also note that this model has an interpretation as the equilibrium distribution of a simple
Markov chain called Glauber dynamics or Gibbs sampling [43]; a discrete time version of
the chain chooses at every step a uniformly random coordinate i and resamples Xi from the
conditional law given all other entries of X; the conditional law is a tilt (see Section 2.3) of
the uniform measure on Sq in the direction of the (appropriately-defined) average vote of
its neighbors.
Mean-field model [58]. In statistical physics, when faced with the problem of under-
standing classes of models like (1), one often starts by solving the mean-field model where
the underlying graph is complete, so that all pairs of vertices interact symmetrically. Fol-
lowing this principle, in this work we primarily focus on understanding the complete graph
(mean-field) model. In the q = 2 case, the complete graph model is known as the Curie-
Weiss model and it is a fundamental example of a solvable Ising model. It is well-known
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that in a variety of ways the behavior of other Ising models on large degree graphs (e.g. the
Ising model on the square lattice Zd or on a d-regular random graph for d large) is similar
to the behavior of the Curie-Weiss model – see e.g. [25, 57, 7]. Explicitly, the distribution
of the mean-field model we consider is
Pr(X = x) =
1
Z
exp
−β
n
∑
i,j
dτ (xi, xj)
 (2)
where x ∈ Snq and the 1/n scaling is known to be the correct scaling from the q = 2 case,
the Curie-Weiss model. In this case, the corresponding Markov chain at every step picks
a coordinate i to resample and resamples it in a way which is slightly correlated with the
average vote of the rest of society2. Informally, we expect this to capture the behavior of
(1) for general graphs with large average degree.
Perfect matching model. In order to understand how the behavior of (1) may change
on sparse graphs, we consider the extreme case where every node has degree one: a perfect
matching. This is the sparsest graph possible without having isolated nodes. We write this
model explicitly as
Pr(X = x, Y = y) =
1
Z
exp
(
−2β
n∑
i=1
dτ (xi, yi)
)
(3)
where we have labeled the pair of voters in matching i so that the first voter has ranking
Xi and the second voter has ranking Yi. The Glauber dynamics step would be to pick an i
randomly, then pick one of Xi or Yi and resamples it in a way correlated with its neighbor,
so this model exhibits only local instead of global interactions.
1.2 Our Results
The main result of this paper is an essentially complete analysis of the q = 3 mean-field
model and the quantitative behavior of Arrow’s Theorem in this model. Our analysis
shows that β = 3/4 is the critical temperature of this model and at this point a sharp
phase transition also occurs in the behavior of general voting schemes. To state the high-
temperature result precisely, we use the following standard notation (specialized to the
q = 3 case) to describe the aggregation scheme:
• We will refer to the candidates in the election as candidates 1, 2, and 3. We let S3
be the symmetric group on 3 elements, i.e. the set of permutations of 1, 2, 3.
• f, g, h are Boolean functions {±1}n → {±1} which represent the aggregation schemes
for each pairwise election.
2As an additional complication, in the dynamics we could suppose that the agents also have a fixed
inherent bias in the ranking they choose. In [58] they consider the effect of choosing such a bias randomly (a
“random field” model) and observed that this can increase the critical β. For simplicity, and following the
main focus in the quantitative social choice literature (e.g. [39, 51]), we focus on the case with no external
field, though many parts should extend to the case with biases (e.g. in [52] it was shown how to analyze the
biased product measure case, using the same general argument as [51] for the unbiased case).
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• The (random) vector of individual voter preferences is X valued in Sn3 .
• Based on X, we define vectors X1, X2, X3 all in {±1}n where the entries of X1 ∈
{±1}n correspond to the individual preferences between candidates 1 and 2, X2 to
the preferences between candidates 1 and 3, and X3 between 2 and 3. In other words,
X1i = 1 if 1 comes before 2 in the permutation Xi.
• The aggregated preferences of society are given by the vector (f(X1), g(X2), h(X3)) ∈
{±1}3. Since f, g, h only depend on X1,X2,X3 respectively, this automatically en-
codes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption.
• NAE3(x, y, z) is the predicate which is true when x, y, and z are not all equal. Note
that intransitivity occurs exactly when f, g, and h are all equal.
• We say that f, g are -close with respect to probability measure P if P (f 6= g) ≤ .
When omitted, the measure P is always the distribution of X under consideration
(usually the mean-field model).
• We define F3 to be the class of functions Sn3 → {±1}3 consisting of dictators (i.e.
functions that depend only on one coordinate) and functions where two of the output
coordinates are constant with opposite sign. As explained above, the coordinates
represent the pairwise elections so the latter functions represent constitutions where
a fixed candidate is ranked top or bottom; Arrow’s Theorem says any IIA rule which
completely avoids paradox must be in F3.
Theorem 1.1 (Mean-field Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem, q = 3). Fix β < 3/4,  > 0.
Suppose the vector of voter preferences X ∈ Sn3 is drawn from the mean field model (2) with
q = 3 candidates. There exists δ = δ(, β) > 0, in particular independent of n, such that at
least one of the following occurs, for any Boolean functions f, g, h : {±1}n → {±1}:
1. The function X 7→ (f(X1), g(X2), h(X3)) which maps Sn3 → {±1}3 is -close to a
function in F3, i.e. the constitution is close to dictator or close to having a fixed top
or bottom candidate.
2. The probability of paradox (an intransitive outcome) is lower bounded by δ:
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1), g(X2), h(X3))) < 1− δ.
With this notation, the result of [51] is exactly the special case of the previous Theorem
with β = 0. Theorem 1.1 is shown by establishing mutual contiguity of the mean-field
model with the i.i.d. model in the entire high-temperature regime, which in turn relies
upon establishing sharp concentration estimates for averages of random vectors drawn from
Uni(NAE3). As mentioned before, we show that in the low-temperature regime β > 3/4
intransitivity is avoided by taking f, g, h to be majority functions, because the probability
of Condorcet’s paradox is exponentially small in n. In fact, we give an exact formula for
the asymptotic probability of Condorcet’s paradox in our model as a function of β, showing
that the probability of paradox goes continuously to 0 as β goes to 3/4:
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Figure 1: Asymptotic probability of a Condercet winner with pairwise majorities as a
function of β in the three candidate mean-field model. At β = 0 we reproduce Guildbaud’s
formula; βc = 3/4 (indicated by dotted line) is where the value goes to 1 and corresponds
to a phase transition between high and low temperature.
Theorem 1.2 (Generalized Guilbaud Formula, q = 3). Let En be the event that there is a
Condorcet winner under pairwise majority elections, where the vector X of individual pref-
erences is drawn from the mean-field model (2) with q = 3. Then the asymptotic probability
of paradox is given by
lim
n→∞Pr(En) =
{
3
2pi arccos(
3
4β−9) if β < 3/4
1 if β > 3/4.
.
This function is graphed in Figure 1.
The proof of the β < 3/4 case is given in Theorem 3.12 and of the β > 3/4 case is
given in Corollary 3.18; the first result is shown by proving Gaussianity of the limiting law
of the averaged vote using tools from probability theory and Fourier analysis; the second
result is also proved by deriving the limiting law of the average vote, which we reduce to
solving an explicit (and involved) variational problem coming from large deviation analysis
of X ∼ NAE3 arising from the naive mean-field approximation for logZ. In both cases,
the probability of a Condorcet winner converges to 1 in the limit β → 3/4, which strongly
suggests that this is the correct answer at the critical temperature β = 3/4; however we
do not provide a rigorous analysis of the critical behavior in this paper. The proof of this
result also establishes that β = 3/4 is the critical temperature for the model in the standard
sense for statistical physics models, which is to say that the limit of 1n logZ is not analytic
at this point. This critical temperature was previously determined in the physics literature
[58] using a heuristic argument; they also gave a way to estimate the probability of paradox
(using Monte-Carlo) but do not seem to have observed an analytical expression as above.
The combination of Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 provide a striking phase transition:
For β > 3/4 we avoid paradoxes with probability 1−o(1) by using the most natural pairwise
voting method, i.e. the majority function. On the other hand for β < 3/4, there is no way
to avoid paradoxes with probability 1−o(1) other than in one of the trivial ways: being o(1)
close to a dictator, or o(1) close to a function which always outputs one of the alternatives
at the top/bottom.
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Mean-field model with larger q. We extend the mean-field Quantitative Arrow’s The-
orem to the case of general q. In this setting, we define a constitution as a function
Snq → {±1}(
q
2) where the coordinates of the output vector are the pairwise preferences
between each pair of candidates. Here Sq is the symmetric group (i.e. set of permutations)
on q elements.
Surprisingly, it turns out that the needed concentration/large deviations analysis (which
determines the high-temperature regime for the model and the nature of the phase transi-
tion) becomes technically much more involved even when q = 4. The concentration problem
is related to (but significantly more general than) the classical study of concentration for
the number of inversions in a random permutation, i.e. Kendall’s τ (see [35]). Based on a
new concentration estimate, we prove a result which is tight up to constants: we show the
model is in a high-temperature regime for β < 1/(q− 1), sharp for all q up to a multiplica-
tive constant of at most 3, and prove a Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem under this condition,
which we now state.
Generalizing the q = 3 case, for any q ≥ 3 we define a class Fq of functionsSnq → {±1}(
q
2)
which completely avoid paradox (i.e. satisfy IIA and transitivity and we require this for any
input, not just with high probability). This class has an explicit characterization (Theorem
1.2 of [51], see also [66]) which we give now. First note that any constitution F satisfying
IIA can be restricted to FS : S
n
|S| → {±1}(
|S
2|) for any S ⊂ [q]. The constitutions F ∈ Fk
are parameterized by a partition of the candidates into disjoint sets, [q] = A1∪· · ·∪At such
that:
• For any r < s, the constitution F always ranks every candidate in Ar above every
candidate in As.
• For all Ar with |Ar| ≥ 3, there exists a voter j such that the restriction of F to the
candidates in Ar is a dictator on voter j.
• For all Ar with |Ar| = 2, the constitution F restricted to the candidates in Ar is an
arbitrary non-constant function.
In particular, such constitutions always either rank one candidate above another, or follow
a dictator with respect to some candidates. The Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem says that
any constitution with low probability of paradox is close to such a constitution:
Theorem 1.3 (Mean-Field Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem for q ≥ 3). Fix q ≥ 3,  > 0,
and β < 1q−1 . Let n ≥ 1 be arbitrary and let X valued in Snq be the random vector of
votes drawn from the mean-field model (2) with at inverse temperature β. There exists
δ = δ(, β, q) > 0 such that for any constitution F : Snq → {±1}(
q
2) satisfying Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), either:
1. F is -close to a function in Fq with respect to the law of X; in particular, F is close
to being a dictator in some elections, or having some fixed pairwise elections.
2. Or, the probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ: if X is the vector of votes
drawn from the model (2), the probability that the aggregated preference vector F (X) ∈
{±1}(q2) satisfies transitivity is at most 1− δ.
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We also show (Section B.2) that the model is in a low-temperature regime when β >
3/(q + 1); we conjecture that this bound is optimal and state a simple large deviations
conjecture (Conjecture 2) which would imply this and generalize the q = 3 case in a natural
way. In [58] the authors also gave strong computational evidence that this is the correct
critical temperature by solving the relevant non-convex variational problem using a gradient
descent-like procedure (iterating the mean field equations).
Sparse models, local interaction, and non-monotone behavior. The above results
show in the mean-field model that when the interactions between different voters is weak, the
Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem continues to hold true. We conjecture that this is a general
phenomenon which should in fact hold in all models at sufficiently high temperature, as
long as β is normalized correctly.
Conjecture 1 (Universal High-Temperature Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem). For any q ≥
3 there exists β = β(q) > 0 such that the following result is true. For any  > 0, there
exists a constant δ = δ(, q) > 0, such that for any n ≥ 1, d ≤ n, and any β′d < β, the
following result holds for X drawn from the Gibbs measure (1) at inverse temperature β′ on
any graph G of maximum degree d. For any constitution F satisfying IIA, either:
1. F is -close to a function in Fq with respect to the law of X; in particular, F is close
to being a dictator in some elections, or having some fixed pairwise elections.
2. Or, the probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ: if X is the vector of votes
drawn from the model (2), the probability that the aggregated preference vector F (X) ∈
{±1}(q2) is transitive is at most 1− δ.
For context, a classical result of Dobrushin (Dobrushin’s uniqueness condition, [19]) tells
us that there does exist such a β such that model is in a high-temperature phase, e.g. in
the sense that Glauber dynamics mixes rapidly [43], and the conjecture is asserting that
this kind of high temperature assumption also implies the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem.
Proving this conjecture appears to be a significant technical challenge. One reason is that
sparse models can generate new behavior which is qualitatively different from the behavior
of the mean-field model. As an illustration, we solve in the q = 3 case for the probability of
a Condorcet paradox occurring in (1) on a perfect matching (i.e. where voters are paired
and only interact with their paired neighbor):
Theorem 1.4 (Generalized Guilbaud Formula on a Perfect Matching). For β ≥ 0 and
n ≥ 1, let X,Y be drawn from the Gibbs measure (3) on the matching graph with q = 3
candidates. Let En be the event that there is a Condorcet winner under pairwise majority
elections. Then
lim
n→∞Pr(En) =
3
2pi
arccos
−1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
 .
As shown in Figure 2, this model exhibits a surprising non-monotonicity property:
while for small values of β the probability of Condorcet paradox is a decreasing function
of β, for all sufficiently large values of β increasing the strength of interactions actually
10
Figure 2: Asymptotic probability of a Condorcet winner with pairwise majority elections
on the perfect matching, as a function of β.
increases the probability of a non-transitive outcome. Conceptually, this suggests increased
coordination within well-connected subcommunities can actually contribute to an increase
in intransitive outcomes: e.g. similar behavior likely occurs if we consider graphs with a few
dense components and with very few edges in between components. We note that different
from the mean-field model, this model does not exhibit a phase transition at any value of
β.
Despite the notable differences between the matchings model from the mean-field model,
we show that as in the mean-field model, the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem holds for the
entire high-temperature regime of this model — in this case, all β ≥ 0. As above we focus
on the q = 3 case, though an extension of the same techniques should be able to prove the
result for larger q.
Theorem 1.5 (Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem on a Matching). For β ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, let
X,Y be drawn from the Gibbs measure (3) on the matching graph with q = 3 candidates.
Fix  > 0. There exists δ = δ(, β) > 0 such that at least one of the following occurs, for
any Boolean functions f, g, h : {±1}2n → {±1}:
1. The function X 7→ (f(X1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3)) from Sn3 → {±1}3 is -close to
a function in F3, i.e. the constitution is close to dictator or close to having a fixed
top or bottom candidate.
2. The probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ:
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1), g(X2), h(X3))) < 1− δ.
This gives strong evidence for the validity of Conjecture 1, as we have proved the result
holds both in the densest model with very “global” interactions (the mean-field model)
and in the matching, which is the extreme opposite case in the sense that every node has
degree 1 and only local interactions are allowed to occur. At a technical level, the proof of
Theorem 1.5 is very different from the mean-field analysis (Theorem 1.1), because the Gibbs
measure on the matching is not mutually contiguous to the product measure for any β > 0.
This makes a reduction to the i.i.d. setting impossible, because the notion of -closeness
is incompatible between the matching and the i.i.d. voter model. Instead, we prove the
result by finding a generalization of the argument of [51] for our setting, using a toolkit of
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reverse hypercontractive estimates, the Invariance Principle, and some new linear-algebraic
arguments in Gaussian space.
1.3 Further Discusssion
The standard generalization of the Ising model and Curie-Weiss model to spins valued in
alphabets of size greater than two is the famous Potts model, and it has been extensively
studied in the literature — see e.g. the review article [21]. In this model each spin takes
a value in an alphabet [q] and there is a fixed cost for neighboring spins to take distinct
values. It is well-known that for q ≥ 3 the mean-field Potts model exhibits what is known
as a first-order phase transition; interestingly, our analysis of the q = 3 permutation-valued
model (which has an alphabet of size 6) shows our model still has a second-order phase
transition like the q = 2 (Ising) case, so the behavior of these two generalizations seems
to be quite different. This reflects the different geometry of the simplex and the polytope
corresponding to the inversion structure of permutations (see Section 2.3).
The work of Starr [62] studied a different kind of mean-field model related to permu-
tations, where the standard Mallows model over Sq is considered in the limit of q → ∞.
As further discussed in the next section, the models we study are connected to a natural
generalization of the Mallows model; it would be interesting to study all of the models
discussed in this paper in the q → ∞ limit, since the large q behavior is not completely
understood (see Conjecture 2 and related discussion).
There has also been a lot of interest in the computational tractability of dealing with
intransitive preferences. Given a collection of intransitive pairwise preferences, finding the
closest set of preferences induced by a permutation is the NP-hard feedback arc-set for
tournaments (FAST) problem; the Kemeny-Young rank aggregation voting scheme is a
special case of weighted FAST. See [2, 41] for approximation algorithms for FAST, [3]
for subexponential time algorithms, and [12] for algorithms for a closely related average
case problem (MLE under the Mallows model). In our analysis we introduce a natural
generalization of the Mallows model, the Inversion Tilt Model, and study its normalizing
constant, which in the zero-temperature limit becomes weighted FAST.
2 Preliminaries
In the Introduction, we discussed the relevant background and notation for Arrow’s The-
orem; here we discuss some other relevant background for the proofs. In sections 2.1 and
2.2, we recall some useful tools from probability theory which are used in the analysis of
the mean-field model. In section 2.3 we note a simple but very useful way to define the
Kendall’s Tau distance in terms of an embedding of the permutation group into Euclidean
space, which will be used throughout the paper. Finally, in the analysis of the matching
model we will need some further background material (hypercontractive estimates, the In-
variance Principle, Schur complement formulae) but we defer further discussion of those
preliminaries to Section 5 where they are used.
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2.1 Cumulant Generating Function and Gibbs Variational Principle
The rigorous analysis of the mean-field model involves a few definitions from large deviations
theory and the study of concentration inequalities which we briefly recall here: see [25, 17]
for more. For X a mean-zero random vector defined over Rd, its cumulant generating
function (CGF) is given by
Ψ(λ) = logE[e〈λ,X〉].
We define the sub-Gaussian constant of X to be the smallest σ (if one exists) such that
Ψ(λ) ≤ σ2‖λ‖2/2.
for all λ ∈ Rd. The Chernoff bound states that
Pr(〈X,w〉 > t) = Pr(exp〈X,w〉 > et) ≤ exp inf
γ≥0
[Ψ(γ〈X,w〉)− γt] .
Note that if X has sub-Gaussian constant σ2, then this gives similar concentration estimates
as when X ∼ N(0, σ2Id), justifying the terminology. Though we will not explicitly use this
fact, in several important situations the Chernoff bound is (asymptotically) optimal because
there is a matching lower bound, as in e.g. Cramer’s Theorem [25, 17].
The following variational principle is useful for analyzing cumulant generating functions
and, more generally, for evaluating normalizing constants such as logZ from the defini-
tion of models like (1). In particular, it expresses that exponentially reweighted measures
with densities of the form ef(X) optimize a tradeoff between maximizing EP [f(X)] and
minimizing relative entropy.
Lemma 2.1 (Gibbs variational principle, [25]). Let X be a random variable distributed
according to Q and suppose EQ[ef(X)] <∞. Then
logEQ[ef(X)] = sup
P
[EP [f(X)]−KL(P,Q)] (4)
where P ranges over all probability measures absolutely continuous with respect to Q, and
KL(P,Q) = EP [log dPdQ(X)] is the relative entropy, also known as Kullback-Liebler diver-
gence; furthermore the maximum is attained by the measure dPdQ(x) ∝ ef(x).
When X is valued in a cartesian product of sets like X1 × · · · × Xn and Q is a product
measure, the naive mean-field approximation (see e.g. [57, 25, 24]) is defined by restricting
the right hand side of (4) to product measures. This approximation is always a lower bound
on the true rhs of (4), is exact when f is linear, and is useful for estimating the normalizing
constant in classical models related to ours like the Curie-Weiss model [25].
2.2 Convergence of Measures
We will need some fundamental tools from probability theory which we recall here; a general
reference for this material is [9] or [22].
Definition 2.2. A sequence of real-valued random variables {Xn}∞n=1 is uniformly integrable
if
lim
α→∞ supn
E[|Xn|1(|Xn| ≥ α)] = 0.
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Definition 2.3. A sequence of random vectors {Xn}n converges in distribution to X if
limn→∞ Eh(Xn) = Eh(X) for all bounded continuous functions h. This is equivalent to
requiring that their CDFs converge at all poitns where the CDF of X is continuous [22].
Note that if Xn → X then f(Xn) → f(X) for f continuous (this is sometimes called the
continuous mapping theorem [22]).
Theorem 2.4 (Corollary of Portmanteau Theorem, Theorem 2.1 of [9]). Suppose that
Xn → X in distribution and X has a continuous pdf. Then
lim
n→∞Pr(Xn ∈ A) = Pr(X ∈ A)
for all Borel-measurable sets A. In particular, the CDFs of a real-valued random variable
converge.
Theorem 2.5 (Multivariate CLT, [22]). Suppose X1, X2, . . . are an i.i.d. sequence of ran-
dom vectors with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ. Then the sequence of partial sums(
1√
n
∑n
i=1Xi
)∞
n=1
converges in distribution to a random variable with law N(0,Σ).
Theorem 2.6 (Theorem 3.5 of [9]). Suppose that Xn → X in distribution and the sequence
of random variables (Xn)
∞
n=1 is uniformly integrable. Then limn→∞ EXn = EX.
The proof the high temperature result will be based on establishing a contiguity result;
informally, contiguity is like absolute continuity for sequences of measures. More precisely,
we recall the relevant definition here (see e.g. [63] for a reference):
Definition 2.7. Let (Pn)
∞
n=1 and (Qn)
∞
n=1 be two sequences of probability measures defined
on the same sequence of measurable spaces. We say that Qn is contiguous to Pn if for any
sequence of measurable sets An, Pn(An) → 0 implies Qn(An) → 0. If Pn is contiguous to
Qn and Qn is contiguous to Pn we say the sequence is mutually contiguous.
2.3 Kendall’s Tau and its inner product structure
In the body of works on quantitative social choice (e.g. [39, 29, 51]) it has been observed
that the permutation group Sq can usefully be embedded into the hypercube {±1}(
q
2) by
viewing a permutation as a list of inversions. For example, when modeling the outcome of
a three-party election we can identify S3 with the subset NAE3 ⊂ {±1}3 consisting of the
6 vectors where not all coordinates are equal, and then pairwise elections under majority
correspond to averaging these embedded vectors and taking their coordinate-wise sign.
This embedding also plays a key role in the solution of the models considered in this
paper, because it gives a useful geometric interpretation of Kendall’s Tau distance in terms
of inner products, which lets us reduce questions about the behavior of mean-field models
on S⊗nq to large deviation questions for random vectors in Euclidean space. Here we lay
out this simple inner product structure explicitly:
Definition 2.8. The Kendell’s Tau distance dτ between two permutations is given by
dτ (pi, pi
′) := #{i < j : 1[pi(i) < pi(j)] 6= 1[pi′(i) < pi′(j)]}.
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Definition 2.9. Define ϕ : Sq → {±1}(
q
2) by
ϕ(pi)i,j = (−1)1[pi(i)>pi(j)]
where the indices range over i < j.
Lemma 2.10. For any permutations pi, pi′ ∈ Sq,
〈ϕ(pi), ϕ(pi′)〉 =
(
q
2
)
− 2dτ (pi, pi′).
Proof. By writing out the left hand side, we see
〈ϕ(pi), ϕ(pi′)〉 =
∑
i<j
(−1)1[pi(i)>pi(j)]+1[pi′(i)>pi′(j)]
=
∑
i<j
(1− 2 · 1[1[pi(i) > pi(j)] 6= 1[pi′(i) > pi′(j)]])
and the last expression equals the right hand side.
Remark 2.11. The particular choice of embedding ϕ is not crucial; any embedding with
the inner products prescribed by Lemma 2.10 works equally well for our purposes.
In the analysis of the models considered in this paper, the following exponential family of
distributions over permutations, which we will refer to as the Inversion Tilt Model, appear
naturally. As we explain below, the normalizing constant in this model is the CGF of
the random vector ϕ(pi) for pi ∼ Uni(Sq), so studying the inversion tilt model is closely
related to the concentration of that random vector, which plays a central role in the mean-
field analysis. These distributions are maximum entropy distributions over permutations
given fixed value of E〈λ, ϕ(pi)〉 (this is a consequence of the Gibbs Variational Principle, see
Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 3.13).
Definition 2.12. The Inversion Tilt Model with parameter λ ∈ R(q2) is the probability
measure on Sq defined by
Pr(pi) =
1
Z
exp (〈λ, ϕ(pi)〉) .
Up to additive constant, logZ is the cumulant generating function Ψ(λ) of the random
vector ϕ(pi) with pi ∼ Uni (Sq). Here the energy function E(pi) = −〈λ, ϕ(pi)〉 can be
interpreted as giving a (possibly negative) cost −λij for inverting the pair (i, j). Besides
appearing in the analysis of the mean-field model, it also appears in the conditional law of
Xi given the rest of X, as used in the natural Markov chain for sampling, Glauber dynamics
(previously discussed in the introduction).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this general model on permuta-
tions has been considered in the literature. The Inversion Tilt Model contains the celebrated
Mallows model [48] and Generalized Mallows Model [28] under the Kendall’s Tau distance
as special cases. Although these models are studied under other distances on permutations
as well, the Mallows model under Kendall’s tau is by far the most popular and well-studied.
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Remark 2.13. A main technical focus of this paper is understanding the behavior of the
normalizing constant Z from the Inversion Tilt Model, especially upper bounds. It is not
too hard to see that Z is NP hard to compute as a function of q and λ ∈ R(q2): if we take
‖λ‖ → ∞ this becomes equivalent to the NP-hard weighted Feedback Arcset in Tournaments
(FAST) problem [1].
3 Mean-Field Model of a Three-Way Election
In this section we thoroughly analyze the behavior of the mean-field model for an election
between three candidates: as we will see this model has a critical inverse temperature
β = 3/4 and we give a detailed description of the behavior of the model both in the high
temprature regime β < 3/4 and low temperature regime β > 3/4. The two candidate model
is classical (Curie-Weiss model) and the reader can refer to [25] for a complete analysis of
it; our arguments follows a similar strategy to reduce various questions about this model to
large deviations problems which we must then solve.
Notation: In this section, instead of invoking the previously described embedding ϕ
of S3 into {±1}3 throughout, it will be more convenient and consistent with previous work
to use the embedding
ϕ˜(pi) :=
(
(−1)1[pi(1)<pi(2)], (−1)1[pi(2)<pi(3)], (−1)1[pi(3)<pi(1)]
)
which differs just in reordering coordinates and flipping the sign of the last coordinate.
In particular, this embedding has the same inner product structure as the ϕ embedding
as used in Lemma 2.10. The reason for picking this embedding (as done in [56])) is that
its image has a convenient description as NAE3, the subset of {±1}n given by removing
{(+1,+1,+1), (−1,−1,−1)}. Equivalently NAE3 is the set of 6 vectors satisfying the not-
all-equals predicate. Using the identification of S3 and NAE3 we can think of the model as
a distribution over x ∈ NAEn3 ⊂
({±1}3)n given by
Pr(X = x) =
1
Z
exp
 β
2n
∑
i,j
〈xi, xj〉

and we will usually refer to NAE3 instead of S3.
3.1 Subcritical regime
3.1.1 Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem
We first recall the following quantitative version of Arrow’s theorem in the i.i.d. setting.
Informally it states that in an election under “impartial culture”, i.e. where voters choices
are drawn i.i.d. from uniform on NAE3, and all candidates have a positive chance of
winning, then there is a positive probability of a paradox (independent of n) unless we have
a near-dictatorship.
Theorem 3.1 (Quantitative Arrow Theorem [51], q = 3 case). Suppose each voter votes
independently and uniformly at random from NAE3 and there are n voters. Fix  > 0.
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There exists δ = δ() > 0 such that at least one of the following occurs, for any Boolean
functions f, g, h : {±1}n → {±1}:
1. The function X 7→ (f(X1), g(X2), h(X3)) from Sn3 → {±1}3 is -close to a function
in F3, i.e. the constitution is close to dictator or close to having a fixed top or bottom
candidate.
2. The probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ:
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1), g(X2), h(X3))) < 1− δ.
In this section we generalize this theorem up to the sharp threshold of βc = 3/4 in
the mean-field model of interacting voters; later we will show that past this point (low
temperature) regime the analogous theorem is false because paradox is indeed avoidable.
Note that the above theorem is the special case of the theorem we will prove with β = 0.
The main technical step in this analysis is the following Lemma which will be proved at the
end of the section:
Lemma 3.2. Fix β < 3/4. Suppose that Yn :=
1√
n
∑n
i=1Xi where the Xi are drawn
i.i.d. from the uniform measure on NAE3. The sequence of random variables Wn :=
exp(β2 〈Yn, Yn〉) is uniformly integrable.
Given the above Lemma, one can show Yn converges to a Gaussian with variance de-
pending on β (Lemma 3.10, deferred to Section 3.1.2) and from these facts establish mutual
contiguity between the mean-field model and the i.i.d. model of voters:
Lemma 3.3. Fix β < 3/4. Let P denote the uniform measure on NAE⊗n3 and Q the mean
field model. There exists f : (0,∞) → (0,∞) decreasing and independent of n such that if
Q(A) > , then P (A) > f() and if P (A) >  then Q(A) > f().
Proof. We give the proof one way, as it is essentially the same both ways. Observe that
Q(A) = EQ[1A] = EP
[
Q(x)
P (x)1A
]
. By the next two lemmas (Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5),
there exists K = K(δ) > 0 such that that if B is the event Q(x)P (x) > e
−K then Pr(B) ≥ 1−δ/2.
Therefore
Q(A) = EP
[
Q(X)
P (X)
1A
]
≥ EP
[
Q(X)
P (X)
1A∩B
]
≥ e−K Pr(A ∩B)
= e−K(Pr(A)− Pr(A ∩BC)) ≥ e−Kδ/2.
Lemma 3.4. Fix δ > 0 In the same setting as Lemma 3.3, there exists K = K(δ, β) such
that with probability at least 1− δ, PrX∼P
(
log P (X)Q(X) > K
)
≤ δ.
Proof. From the above formula we have that log P (X)Q(X) = (logZ−n log(2))− β2n 〈
∑
iXi,
∑
iXi〉.
By Hoeffding’s inequality [64] applied under the i.i.d. measure P , we can bound each of the
three coordinates of
∑
iXi by O(
√
n log(2/δ)) with probability at least 1−δ/2, which lets us
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control the last term. It remains to control logZ, which follows from uniform integrability
(Lemma 3.2), as
logZ − n log 2 = log 1
2n
Z = logEX∼P [exp((β/2)〈Yn, Yn〉)] ∈ [0, Cβ] (5)
which proves the result.
Lemma 3.5. Fix δ > 0. In the same setting as Lemma 3.3, there exists K = K(δ, β) such
that with probability at least 1− δ, PrX∼Q
(
log Q(X)P (X) > K
)
≤ δ.
Proof. Again we have log Q(X)P (X) = (n log 2− logZ) + β2
〈
1√
n
∑
iXi,
1√
n
∑
iXi
〉
and the first
term is nonpositive by (5). For the second term, we use Lemma 3.10 and Gaussian tail
bounds to get that for sufficiently large n, with probability at least 1 − δ the size of the
coordinates are at most O(
√
log(2/δ)). For small n we simply bound the term by a constant.
Theorem 3.6 (Mean-Field Quantitative Arrow Theorem, Restatement of Theorem 1.1).
Fix β < 3/4. Suppose the vector of voter preferences X ∈ Sn3 is drawn from the mean field
model (2) with q = 3 candidates. Fix  > 0. There exists δ = δ() > 0 such that at least
one of the following occurs, for any Boolean functions f, g, h : {±1}n → {±1}:
1. The function X 7→ (f(X1), g(X2), h(X3)) from Sn3 → {±1}3 is -close to a function
in F3, i.e. the constitution is close to dictator or close to having a fixed top or bottom
candidate.
2. The probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ:
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1), g(X2), h(X3))) < 1− δ.
Proof. Fix  > 0 and let ′ > 0 be such that for any event A if P (A) > 1 − ′ then
Q(A) > 1 −  by appling Lemma 3.3. Let δ′ = δ′(′) > 0 be as specified in Theorem 3.1.
Finally, choose δ = δ(δ′) by Lemma 3.3 so that if P (A) > 1 − δ′ then Q(A) > 1 − δ. We
claim that this δ (which depends only on ) satisfies the claim in the Theorem: if A is the
event that the constitution is -close to an element of F3 and we suppose A does not occur,
then the constitution is not ′-close to an element of F3 under the i.i.d. measure, therefore
by Theorem 3.1 the probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ′ under the i.i.d. measure
which implies a lower bound of δ under the mean-field measure.
Finally, we prove the key uniform integrability result. We use the following standard
result about nets and a useful inequality:
Lemma 3.7 (Lemma 4.4.1 of [64]). If Nδ is a δ-net of the unit sphere in Rd, then
maxu:‖u‖2=1〈x, u〉 ≤ 11−δ maxu∈Nδ〈x, u〉.
Lemma 3.8. For any a, b, c ∈ R, 13(cosh(a) + cosh(b) + cosh(c)) ≤ exp(a2/6 + b2/6 + c2/6).
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Proof. By expanding both sides, it is equivalent to show that
1
3
∑
k
a2k + b2k + c2k
(2k)!
≤
∞∑
k=0
(a2 + b2 + c2)k
6kk!
.
By nonnegativity of all terms and symmetry it suffices to check this for the coefficients only
involving a, where it reduces to 6kk! ≤ 3(2k)! for k ≥ 1. This follows from induction, as
6(k + 1) ≤ (2k + 2)(2k + 1) for k ≥ 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Observe that
EYn∼P [Wn1(Wn > α)] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(Wn1(Wn > α) > w)dw
= αPr(Wn > α) +
∫ ∞
α
Pr(Wn > w)dw.
so it suffices to show that Pr(Wn > w) = O(w
−(1+)) for any  > 0. Define x > 0 by
w = exp((β/2)x2) and fix δ > 0 (to be taken small). Then by Lemma 3.7 and the union
bound
Pr(Wn > w) = Pr(〈Yn, Yn〉 > x2) = Pr( max
u:‖u‖2=1
〈Yn, u〉 > x) ≤ |N(δ)|max
u∈Nδ
Pr(〈Yn, u〉 > (1−δ)x).
By applying the Chernoff bound (i.e. the general inequality Pr(X > a) ≤ E[eλX ]/eλa) we
know that for any vector u, Pr(〈Yn, u〉 > (1− δ)x) ≤ minλ≥0 E[exp(λ〈Yn,u〉)]eλ(1−δ)x . Now we observe
the following sub-gaussian bound:
max
‖u‖2=1
logE[exp(λ〈Yn, u〉)]
= max
‖u‖2=1
n logEX∼NAE3 [exp(
λ√
n
〈X,u〉)]
= max
‖u‖2=1
n log
1
3
(cosh(
λ√
n
(u1 + u2 − u3)) + cosh( λ√
n
(u1 − u2 + u3)) + cosh( λ√
n
(−u1 + u2 + u3)))
≤ max
‖u‖2=1
1
6
λ2[(u1 + u2 − u3)2 + (u1 − u2 + u3)2 + (−u1 + u2 + u3)2] = 2
3
λ2
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.8 and the last equality follows by computing
the maximum of the quadratic form as the top eigenvalue of the corresponding matrix –
the eigenvalue computation is done explicitly in Lemma B.2 for general q. It follows that
Pr(〈Yn, u〉 > (1− δ)x) ≤ min
λ≥0
e(2/3)λ
2−λ(1−δ)x = e(3/8)(1−δ)
2x2−(3/4)(1−δ)2x2 = e−(3/8)(1−δ)
2x2
(since the minimizer is at λ = (3/4)(1− δ)x) so combining everything
Pr(Wn > w) ≤ |N(δ)| exp(−(3/8)(1− δ)2x2) = |N(δ)|w−
3
4β
(1−δ)2
.
Note that |N(δ)| does not depend on n since the net is over a sphere in fixed dimension
(three dimensions). Finally, as long as β < 3/4 we can choose δ sufficiently small such that
3
4β (1− δ)2 = 1 +  which proves the result.
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3.1.2 Generalized Guilbaud’s Formula
In the following two lemmas we compute the limiting distribution of Yn. In [58] the authors
also computed what the limiting covariance matrix should be, though they did not give a
mathematically rigorous proof of this.
Lemma 3.9. For every β < 3/4, limn→∞(logZ(β)− n log(6)) = log
√
det Σβ
det Σ0
where
Σβ =
1
4β2 − 15β + 9
9− 4β −3 −3−3 9− 4β −3
−3 −3 9− 4β
 .
Proof. Observe that
logZ − n log 6 = log 1
6n
Z = logEYn∼P
[
exp(
β
2
〈Yn, Yn〉)
]
= logEYn∼P
[
exp(
β
2
〈Yn, Yn〉)
]
.
By the Lemma 3.2, exp(β2 〈Yn, Yn〉) is uniformly integrable. Therefore from the Central
Limit Theorem and Theorem 2.6 we have
lim
n→∞ logEYn∼P
[
exp
(
β
2
〈Yn, Yn〉
)]
= logEZ∼N(0,Σ0) exp
(
β
2
〈Yn, Yn〉
)
= log
√
det Σβ
det Σ0
.
The last equality follows by computing normalizing constants for Gaussian distributions,
since
EZ∼N(0,Σ0)
[
exp
(
β
2
〈Yn, Yn〉
)]
=
1√
2pi det Σ0
∫
e−y
TΣ−10 y/2+(β/2)y
T ydy
and the integral is just the normalizing constant for another multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution. To perform the last calculation explicitly, observe that Σ0 is the covariance matrix
of Yn in the β = 0 case (as explained in detail in the proof of Lemma B.2), so computing its
inverse Σ−10 , we see that under the exponential reweighting we get new inverse covariance
(i.e. precision) matrix
Θβ = Σ
−1
0 − βI =
3/2− β 3/4 3/43/4 3/2− β 3/4
3/4 3/4 3/2− β

and inverting Θβ (using the assumption β < 3/4) gives the expression above for Σβ, so using
the standard formula for the normalizing constant of a multivariate Gaussian distribution
gives the result.
A similar argument proves the following Lemma as well.
Lemma 3.10. Fix β < 3/4. Yn :=
1√
n
∑
iXi converges in distribution to Y ∼ N(0,Σβ).
Proof. Let h be an arbitrary continuous, bounded function. We need to show limn→∞ Eh (Yn) =
EY∼N(0,Σβ)h(Y ). Let Q denote the Gibbs measure and P denote the measure where
X ∼ NAE⊗n3 and Yn is defined the same way. Observe that dQdP = 2
n
Z exp(
β
2 〈Yn, Yn〉)
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and 1 = EP dQdP =
2n
Z EP exp(
β
2 〈Yn, Yn〉) so we can replace 2n/Z by 1/EP exp(β2 〈Yn, Yn〉).
Writing out dQ/dP gives
EQh (Yn) = EP
[
h(Yn)
exp((β/2)〈Yn, Yn〉)
E exp((β/2)〈Yn, Yn〉)
]
.
By the Central Limit Theorem (Theorem 2.5) we know that under P , Yn → N(0,Σ0) and
we want to check uniform integrability to replace the expectation by the Gaussian one.
Since h is bounded it clearly suffices to check this for Wn := exp((β/2)〈Yn, Yn〉) which was
proved in Lemma 3.2. Then the result follows from the calculation in Lemma 3.9.
The spherical symmetry of the standard Gaussian implies the following well-known
formula which can be found in a variety of references, such as [56, 64]:
Lemma 3.11 ([56, 64]). Suppose that X ∼ N(0,Σ) where Σ : 2×2. Then E[sgn(X1)sgn(X2)] =
1− 2 arccos ρpi where ρ = Σ12√Σ11Σ22 .
Theorem 3.12. For β < 3/4, the asymptotic (in n) probability of a Condercet winner in
the three-candidate mean-field model is 32pi arccos
(
3
4β−9
)
.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.11 and Lemma 3.10 since the above expression equals
(3/4)(1− E[sgn(Y 1)sgn(Y 2)]).
This result gives the first part of the curve in Figure 1.
3.2 Supercritical regime
At a high level, the analysis of the supercritical regime proceeds in a similar way to the
analysis of other mean-field models such as Curie-Weiss. That is to say, we can show fairly
directly that the naive mean-field approximation is an accurate estimate of logZ (see the
proof of Theorem 3.16), so that the asymptotic value of 1n logZ is given by a concrete
optimization problem over measures on NAE3 (maximizing Φ(s) defined below). From a
large deviation perspective, we know that for X ∼ Uni(NAE3), the quantity ‖ 1n
∑
iXi‖
converges to zero by the law of large numbers, and this optimization problem is asking for the
typical behavior of 1n
∑
iXi if we condition on the unlikely event that ‖ 1n
∑
iXi‖ = Ω(1) —
this is made precise by Cramer’s Theorem [25, 17]. The next step is to solve this optimization
problem, which in our case is quite involved; once we have solved this problem, we can use
a symmetry argument to characterize the limiting law of 1n
∑n
i=1Xi and prove that the
probability of Condorcet paradox is exponentially small.
To begin the analysis, we recall a (slight special case of) the Gibbs variational principle
(4), when we look at X distributed according to the uniform measure on a set X .
Lemma 3.13 (Gibbs variational principle, [25]). Let X be a finite set. Then
log
∑
x∈X
ef(x) = sup
P∈P(X )
EP [f(X)] +HP (X)
where P ranges over all probability distributions of random variable X valued in X and
HP (X) = EP [− logP (X)] is the Shannon entropy.
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As explained above, Φ(s) is a functional such that the maximum of Φ corresponds to the
value of the free energy 1n logZ (we prove this in Theorem 3.16). This raises the question of
characterizing the maximum of Φ. Because the inversion tilt model is a maximum-entropy
distribution (from the above variational principle), we can derive mean-field equations by
introducing dual variables λ1, λ2, λ3, which are the parameters of an inversion tilt model,
and relating them to primal variables s1, s2, s3 at a critical point:
Lemma 3.14. Fix β and define
Φ(s) :=
β
2
‖s‖22 + max
Q∈P(NAE3):EQX=s
HQ(X).
where we interpret the maximum to be −∞ if no such Q exists. Then at any critical point
of Φ,
Φ(s) = −β
2
‖s‖22 + log 2 + log(cosh(λ1 +λ2−λ3) + cosh(λ1−λ2 +λ3) + cosh(−λ1 +λ2 +λ3))
for λ1, λ2, λ3 which are solutions of
s1 =
sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3)− sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3)
cosh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + cosh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + cosh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3) (6)
s2 =
sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3)− sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3)
cosh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + cosh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + cosh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3) (7)
s3 =
− sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3)
cosh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + cosh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + cosh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3) . (8)
and also satisfy λi = βsi for all i.
Proof. Observe by the minimax theorem [61] and the Gibbs variational principle (Lemma 3.13)
that
max
Q∈P(NAE3):EQX=s
HQ(X) = max
Q∈P(NAE3)
min
λ
HQ(X) + 〈λ,EQX − s〉
= min
λ
max
Q∈P(NAE3)
(HQ(X) + 〈λ,EQX − s〉)
= min
λ
−〈λ, s〉+ log
∑
x∈NAE3
e〈λ,x〉.
Note that for arbitrary λ (not necessarily related to s), we have
log
∑
x∈NAE3
e〈λ,x〉 = log 2+log(cosh(λ1 +λ2−λ3)+cosh(λ1−λ2 +λ3)+cosh(−λ1 +λ2 +λ3))
so using that Eλ[X] = ∇λ log
∑
x∈NAE3 e
〈λ,x〉 and considering the first-order optimality
conditions, we see that the optimizer λ in the minimization problem above must satisfy (6),
(7), and (8) above. It remains to show that at a critical point, λ and s satisfy λi = βsi for
all i. Write
Ψ(λ) :=
β
2
‖s(λ)‖22−〈λ, s(λ)〉+log(cosh(λ1+λ2−λ3)+cosh(λ1−λ2+λ3)+cosh(−λ1+λ2+λ3))+log 2
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so that Φ(s) = Ψ(λ). Observe that
Ψ′(λ) = βs(λ)T s′(λ)− s(λ)T − λT s′(λ) + s(λ)T = βs(λ)T s′(λ)− λT s′(λ).
Furthermore, we claim that the Jacobian s′(λ) is always invertible, so the solutions must sat-
isfy λ = βs(λ). To see that the Jacobian is invertible, observe that s′(λ) = ∇2 log∑x∈NAE3 e〈λ,x〉 =
(Eλ[XaXb]− Eλ[Xa]Eλ[Xb])a,b = Σλ where Σλ is the covariance matrix of X = ϕ(pi) where
pi is drawn from the Inversion Tilt Model with parameter λ. For any finite λ we know
for a, b, c distinct elements of {1, 2, 3} that Var(Xa|Xb, Xc) > 0 which shows there cannot
be any linear relation between the coordinates of random vector X ∈ {±1}3, hence Σλ is
invertible.
In order to understand the low-temperature behavior of the model, we will need to solve
the mean-field equations from Lemma 3.14 which we do in the following Lemma 3.15. In
the proof of Lemma 3.15, we solve the equations to the point where they reduce to con-
crete statements about analytic functions in one and two dimensions and then check those
statements using some computer-generated plots (Figure 4 and Figure 5). In principle the
use of plots can be replaced by appeal to a formal decision procedure for the correspond-
ing theory of real arithmetic, assuming a weak version of Schanuel’s conjecture from field
theory [65]. For completeness, in Appendix A we also sketch the proof of a weaker version
of Lemma 3.15 which still suffices to prove Theorem 3.16 below, and doesn’t rely upon the
computer-generated plots.
Lemma 3.15. For all β, the solutions to the equations in Lemma 3.14 are of one of the
following types, up to symmetries of permuting coordinates and λ 7→ −λ:
1. Of the form λ1 = λ2 = λ3
2. Of the form λ1 = 0, λ2 = −λ3.
3. Of the form λ1 = λ2 where λ3 has the opposite sign of λ1 and up to symmetries, this
point is unique (for β > 3/4 it has an orbit of size exactly 6).
Furthermore, the points of the third type are the global maximizers of Φ for every fixed value
of β.
Theorem 3.16. Fix arbitrary β > 3/4. Define Sn :=
1√
n
Yn =
1
n
∑
iXi. The random
variables Sn converge in distribution to S distributed according to the uniform measure on
the 6 global maximizers described in Lemma 3.15. Furthermore, if Sβ is the set of these
6 points in the support of S, then for any  > 0 there exists c = cβ, > 0 such that
Pr(mins∈Sβ ‖Sn − s‖ ≥ ) ≤ 2e−cn.
Proof. Observe that the support of Sn is contained in the compact set [−1, 1]3. Therefore,
by Prokhorov’s theorem [9] there exists at least one subsequential limit µ of the sequence
of measures of S1, S2, S3, . . . and we proceed to characterize this limit.
Observe that Pr(Sn = s) ∝ exp
(
nβ2 ‖s‖22 + log #{x ∈ NAEn3 : s =
∑
i x}
)
. Therefore
for any measurable setK, Pr(Sn ∈ K) ∝
∑
s∈U exp
(
nβ2 ‖s‖22 + log #{x ∈ NAEn3 : s =
∑
i x}
)
.
If K is a closed set that does not contain one of the 6 maximizers of the mean-field problem
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described in Lemma 3.15, then we will show by applying large deviations methods that
limn→∞ Pr(Sn ∈ K) = 0. Explicitly, if we let  > 0 be such that maxs∈K Φ(s) < Φ(s∗)− 
where s∗ is a maximizer of Φ over all s, where such  exists by compactness of K, then by
the union bound over the possible values of Yn which lie in K we get that
Pr(Sn ∈ K) = 1
Zn
∑
sn∈K
exp
(
n
β
2
‖s‖22 + log #{x ∈ NAEn3 : s =
∑
i
x}
)
≤ C
Zn
n3 max
sn∈K
exp
(
n
β
2
‖s‖22 + log #{x ∈ NAEn3 : s =
∑
i
x}
)
≤ C
Zn
n3 max
sn∈K
exp
(
n
β
2
‖s‖22 + nH(X1|Sn = sn)
)
≤ Cn
3 exp(n(Φ(s∗)− ))
Zn
.
where in the first inequality we used that there are only O(n3) possible values for Sn, in
the second inequality we used that log |S| = H(X) where X is chosen uniformly at random
over S [15], the sub-additivity inequality H(X1, . . . , Xn) ≤
∑
iH(Xi) for entropy [15], and
the fact that the coordinates of X are all symmetrical, and in the final inequality used the
definitions of  and Φ. We know by the Gibbs variational principle (Lemma 3.13) that by
plugging into the supremum the product measure P⊗nλ where Pλ is the Inversion Tilt Model
with λ = s∗β that logZn ≥ nΦ(s∗) therefore we see that the above probability converges
to 0 as n→∞. Furthermore, this proves the large deviation bound in the statement of the
Theorem by taking K to be the set of points with distance at least  from Sβ.
It follows that any limiting distribution must be supported on the set of 6 symmetrical
global maximizers from Lemma 3.15. Since they are symmetrical and the random variables
Sn respect this symmetry, the measure must be the uniform measure. It follows that this
is the unique limiting distribution.
Remark 3.17. Interestingly, this result tells us that society breaks symmetry in a way
such that all pairwise elections are won by a Ω(n) margin of votes (which would not happen
if, for example, the solutions of type 2 in Lemma 3.15 were optimal).
Corollary 3.18. For β > 3/4, the asymptotic (as n→∞) probability of a Condorcet winner
in the three-candidate mean-field model under pairwise majority is equal to 1. Furthermore,
there exists c = cβ > 0 such that the probability is at least 1− 2 exp(−cβn).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.16 and analysis of the six symmetrical cases: in par-
ticular, if λ1 = λ2 > 0 and λ3 < 0, then under pairwise majority election with probability
1− on→∞(1), candidate 1 will beat candidates 2 and 3 in the corresponding pairwise elec-
tions, and 2 will beat 3, so candidate 1 is a Condorcet winner. The existence of cβ > 0
follows from the above case analysis and the large deviation bound in Theorem 3.16.
4 Mean-Field Model with Arbitrarily Many Candidates
Based on the analysis in the q = 3 setting, a plausible conjecture would be that many of
the same behaviors occur in the case q > 3: if βc corresponds to the “critical temperature”
of the model (for us, the point where the limiting free energy 1n logZ is not analytic, which
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we expect to be unique) then for the entire high-temperature phase β < βc the Quantita-
tive Arrow’s Theorem holds, and in the entire low-temperature phase βc < β elections by
pairwise majority should yield a Condorcet winner with probability 1− on→∞(1).
It turns out generalizing these results to larger q is difficult. One key step in the proof
of Theorem 3.6 fails to generalize to larger values of q: in Lemma 3.2, the upper bound
on the cumulant generating function logE[exp(λ〈Yn, u〉)] by Taylor expansion and naively
comparing monomials term by term, i.e. Lemma 3.8, gives a very weak bound for larger
values of q (the constant grows exponentially with q). Therefore new ideas are needed to
prove an upper bound on this constant (the sub-Gaussian constant of the random vector
ϕ(pi)) which scales correctly with q.
In the next section, we prove a large deviation bound which is optimal up to a constant
factor of at most 3 (for all q), from which the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem for a high-
temperature regime β ≤ 1/(q − 1) is derived. In the final section we show the model
enters a low-temperature phase for β > 3/(q + 1) by lower bounding 1n logZ, ruling out
the possibility that 1n logZ is an analytic extension of its high temperature behavior (i.e.
constant) which means the critical temperature must be in-between. We also state a simple
conjecture which would eliminate the gap of 3 between these two regimes, identifying the
location of the phase transition.
4.1 Large deviations inequality
As described above, the key tool we need to extend the q = 3 high-temperature analysis
to q > 3 is a good estimate on the cumulant generating function of ϕ(pi) for pi ∼ Sq. The
following Lemma gives a sub-Gaussian inequality, proved via martingale and symmetriza-
tion techniques, which for every q is sharp up to a constant factor of at most 3; however
we conjecture below (Conjecture 2) that the sharp constant for this inequality is better,
generalizing the bound we proved earlier for the q = 3 case in a natural way.
Crucially, Lemma 4.1 is much stronger than the trivial estimate one gets from the fact
‖X‖2 = O(q), which by Hoeffding’s inequality [64] implies a bound for the sub-Gaussian
constant of the incorrect order O(q2).
Lemma 4.1. For any vector λ, if if we let random vector X = ϕ(pi) for pi ∼ Uniform(Sq)
with q ≥ 2 then
logE[exp(〈λ,X〉)] ≤ q − 1
2
‖λ‖22.
Proof. Observe by pairing up each permutation with its reversed version (i.e. the permu-
tation pi′ = pi ◦ (i 7→ q − i+ 1)) that E[exp(〈λ,X〉)] = E[cosh(〈λ,X〉)].
We now prove the inequality using a Doob martingale. For the filtration, we think
of the permutation as being generated by a Fisher-Yates shuffle, i.e. picking in order
j1 = pi
−1(1), j2 = pi−1(2), . . . where at each step jt is chosen uniformly at random from the
elements of [q] \ {j1, . . . , jt−1}. Define λj1 by projection onto the set of coordinates which
involve j1 (i.e. indexed by pairs (i, j1) and (j1, k)) and define λ∼j1 to be the complement, and
define Xj1 , X∼j1 likewise. Using the identity cosh(a+ b) = cosh(a) cosh(b) + sinh(a) sinh(b),
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observe that
E[cosh(〈λ,X〉)] = E[cosh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉) cosh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉) + sinh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉) sinh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉)]
= E[cosh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉) cosh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉)]
= E[cosh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉)E[cosh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉)|j1]]
= E[cosh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉) · · · cosh(〈λjq−1 , Xjq−1〉)]
where in the second equality we used that E[sinh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉)|j1] = 0 by symmetry consid-
erations, and in the last equality we applied the argument inductively on E[cosh(〈λ∼j1 , X∼j1〉)|j1].
Using the inequality cosh(x) ≤ ex2/2, the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, and Holder’s inequal-
ity we see that
cosh(〈λj1 , Xj1〉) · · · cosh(〈λjq−1 , Xjq−1〉) ≤ exp
(∑
t
〈λjt , Xjt〉2/2
)
≤ exp
(∑
t
‖λjt‖2
q − 1− t
2
)
≤ exp
(
‖λ‖2 q − 1
2
)
so taking the expectation and logarithm gives the result.
Remark 4.2. The replacement of exp by cosh in the proof of Lemma 4.1 is equivalent to
“symmetrizing” the Fisher-Yates shuffle: at every step of the shuffle, we flip a fair coin and
depending on its outcome inserts a randomly chosen element either at the front of the list
or at the back of the final list, then iterate recursively on the remaining elements.
Conjecture 2. In the same setting as Lemma 4.1, we conjecture that
logE[exp(〈λ,X〉)] ≤ q + 1
6
‖λ‖22.
If true, this constant is sharp because it is attained in the limit λ→ 0 (by Taylor expansion
and computing the top eigenvalue of the covariance matrix, see Lemma B.2).
Remark 4.3. In terms of concentration inequalities, the sub-Gaussian bound in Lemma 4.1
gives that for X = ϕ(pi), pi ∼ Uni(Sq), and ‖w‖ ≤ 1
Pr[〈w,X〉 > t] ≤ e−t2/2(q−1)
and Conjecture 2 would give the improved estimate
Pr[〈w,X〉 > t] ≤ e−3t2/2(q+1)
sharpening the constant in the exponent. We remark that in the special case that w is
along the all-ones direction, the quantity 〈w,X〉 correspond to Kendall’s τ statistic and its
concentration plays an important role in statistical tests (see e.g. [36]).
Some preliminary computer simulations support this conjecture for small values of q, and
were also performed in [58]. As we will see in the next sections, if we knew this conjecture
then we could identify the critical temperature for these models exactly as well as prove a
Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem in the entire high-temperature regime.
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4.2 High-temperature Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem
From the large deviation inequality above (Lemma 4.1), we can use similar arguments to
the proof of Theorem 1.1 to prove a Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem under the assumption
β < 1/(q − 1). The details of the proof are left to the Appendix.
4.3 Low-temperature behavior
In this section, we prove the model must be in its low-temperature phase for β > 3/(q+ 1)
in the sense it is not mutually contiguous to the product measure, and the limiting behavior
of 1n logZ is not an analytic extension of its high temperature behavior (i.e. it is not equal
to a constant); therefore the model must exhibit a phase transition at or before 3/(q + 1)
and the high-temperature contiguity estimate from the previous section is off by at most
a factor of (slightly less than) three. The techniques are based upon the naive mean-field
approximation and computing its second order expansion around its “trivial” critical point
at the origin; details and proofs are left to the Appendix.
5 Perfect Matching Model
We proceed to study the perfect matching model 3 mentioned in the introduction. We recall
that we denote the pairs of voters in a matching by Xi and Yi and let n denote the total
number of matchings (i.e. half the number of total voters), so that the joint measure will
be
Pr(X = x, Y = y) =
1
Z
exp
(
n∑
i=1
β〈ϕ(xi), ϕ(yi)〉
)
. (9)
In the first subsection below, we compute the probability of a Condorcet winner under
pairwise elections. Surprisingly, our calculation shows that one feature of the mean-field
model, that the probability of a Condorcet winner is increasing in β, is not universal.
Instead, the probability is increasing only for small values of β; for larger values of β,
increasing the strength of interactions in the model monotonically decreases the probability
of a Condorcet winner (see Figure 2).
We then proceed to prove the main result of this section, that the Quantitative Arrow’s
Theorem holds for every β ≥ 0. The proof is technically involved: we first give a high level
overview of the proof, state and prove some needed estimates, and then show step-by-step
how to adapt the proof from the original product measure setting [51].
5.1 Probability of paradox under pairwise majority
Using the Central Limit Theorem, we can derive the analogous version of Guilbaud’s formula
for the matching by computing the covariance matrix corresponding to each pair of voters.
We leave the calculation to the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1. For β > 0, let (X,Y ) be distributed according to the Gibbs measure (9) with
2n voters. Let En be the event that there is a Condorcet winner under pairwise majority
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elections. Then
lim
n→∞Pr(En) =
3
2pi
arccos
−1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
 .
As we can see in Figure 2, the probability of Condorcet election goes up and then goes
back down to its original value as we increase β. The fact that the boundary cases β = 0
and β = ∞ behave the same way is not a coincidence: when β = ∞ the two nodes in a
matching are perfectly correlated, so they should act the same way as a single node in the
β = 0 setting.
5.2 Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem
In this section, for all finite values of β ≥ 0 we prove that given  > 0 the probability
of paradox for constitutions -far from F3 is lower bounded by δ = δ(β, ) independent of
n for any constitution satisfying the hypotheses of Arrow’s theorem. In this setting, the
result cannot be proved by a mutual contiguity argument: there are constitutions with a
low probability of paradox in the matching model which have a high probability of paradox
in the product measure setting; this is consistent with the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem
because the notion of -close is distribution dependent. For example, constitutions which
count the number of agreements between Xa1 and Ya1 for a = 1 to n will behave very
differently in the product measure (β = 0) and finite temperature (β > 0) setting.
The proof strategy follows the same general template as the proof for independent voters
developed in [51] and uses general reverse hypercontractive estimates developed in [52]. The
key similarity that allows us to use these techniques is that the distribution of votes is still
given by a product measure if we group pairs of voters; the main obstacle that we have to
overcome is that unlike the setting with truly independent voters, the conditional law of the
election between candidates 2 and 3 given the results of an election between candidates 1 and
2 is significantly more complicated. In particular, this complicates the step of the argument
where low-influence functions are handled using the Invariance Principle and arguments
in Gaussian space. In the first two subsections below, we develop the necessary estimates
needed to overcome this issue using reverse hypercontractivity and linear algebraic tools
such as Schur complement formulae.
5.2.1 Reverse hypercontractive estimates
First we recall an important estimate for discrete distributions which follows from a general
form of reverse hypercontractivity.
Lemma 5.2 (Lemma 8.3 of [52]). Suppose Ω is a finite probability space and (Xi, Yi)
n
i=1
are i.i.d. jointly distributed Ω2-valued random variables. Suppose
α := min
a,b:Pr(Y1=b)>0
Pr(X1 = a, Y1 = b)
Pr(X1 = a) Pr(Y1 = b)
> 0.
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). Then for any sets A,B ⊂ Ωn such that
Pr(X ∈ A) ≥  and Pr(Y ∈ B) ≥  it follows that
Pr(X ∈ A, Y ∈ B) ≥ 
2−√1−α
1−√1−α .
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We also need an analogous estimate for correlated Gaussian vectors, which we will prove
below as Lemma 5.6. To state the result, we need an important Schur complement formula
for multivariate Gaussians (see e.g. [67] for a reference).
Lemma 5.3 (Schur Complement Formula [67]). Suppose X and Y are zero-mean correlated
Gaussian vectors with joint covariance matrix
Σ =
[
ΣX ΣXY
ΣY X ΣY
]
.
Then the law of Y conditional on X is given by N
(
ΣY XΣ
−1
XXX,ΣY − ΣY XΣ−1XXΣXY
)
In particular, note that the conditional covariance matrix does not depend on the par-
ticular value of X. We also need the reverse hypercontractive estimate for Gaussians estab-
lished in [11]. Here as usual ‖f‖p := E[fp]1/p, and we use this notation even when p < 1
(where ‖ · ‖p is no longer a norm).
Definition 5.4 (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck semigroup). The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck semigroup is
defined for t ≥ 0 as
(Ttf)(x) := EZ∼N(0,1)[f(e−tx+
√
1− e−2tZ)]
for f ∈ L1(γ) and γ the standard Gaussian measure N(0, 1).
Theorem 5.5 (Reverse Hypercontractivity for Gaussians [11]). For any strictly positive f
and p, q < 1
‖Ttf‖Lq(γ) ≥ ‖f‖Lp(γ)
as long as t ≥ 12 log 1−q1−p , where γ is the standard Gaussian measure.
We can now give the needed reverse hypercontractive estimates for general correlated
Gaussian vectors:
Lemma 5.6. Suppose that (Xi, Yi)
n
i=1 are i.i.d. samples from N(0,Σ) with Σ  0 and block
decompose
Σ =
[
ΣX ΣXY
ΣY X ΣY
]
.
Define
α :=
1
λmax(Σ
−1/2
Y ΣY XΣ
−1
X ΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y )
− 1
and suppose α > 0 (this is implied by ΣY |X  0). Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yn). Then:
1. Let K be the Markov kernel corresponding to the conditional law of Y1|X1, then for
any strictly positive f and arbitrary q < p < 1,
‖(K⊗nf)(X)‖Lq(µ⊗n) ≥ ‖f(Y )‖Lp(ν⊗n)
where µ is the (Gaussian) law of X1, ν is the law of Y1, and t ≥ 12 log 1−q1−p where
t :=
1
2
log(1 + α).
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2. For all 0 < p, q < 1 and all nonnegative f, g,
E[fK⊗ng] ≥ ‖f‖Lq(µ⊗n)‖g‖Lp(ν⊗n)
where K,µ, ν, t are defined as above and assuming t ≥ 12 log 1(1−p)(1−q) .
3. For any measurable sets A,B ⊂ Rnd such that Pr(X ∈ A) ≥  and Pr(Y ∈ B) ≥  it
follows that
Pr(X ∈ A, Y ∈ B) ≥ 
2−e−t/2
1−e−t/2
where t is as defined above.
Proof. First we can reduce to the case ΣX = I,ΣY = I by defining X
′ = Σ−1/2X X and
Y ′ = Σ−1/2Y Y ; observe that ΣX′ := E[(X
′)(X ′)T ] = I, similarly ΣY ′ = I, and ΣX′Y ′ :=
E[X ′(Y ′)T ] = Σ−1/2X ΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y , so
ΣY ′X′ΣX′Y ′ = Σ
−1/2
Y ΣY XΣ
−1
XXΣXY Σ
−1/2
Y Y
which shows that moving to X ′ preserves the value of α, and all other quantities (functional
norms, etc.) are clearly basis invariant. From now on we assume ΣX = I,ΣY = I.
(1). For (1), this form of reverse hypercontractive inequality is known to tensorize (see
[11, 52]) so it suffices to prove the result in the case n = 1. Explicitly, we show that K
factorizes so that K(f) = Tt(S(f)) for t > 0 defined in the theorem statement and S a
Markov kernel, and hence
‖Kf‖Lq(µ) = ‖Tt(Sf)‖Lq(µ) ≥ ‖Sf‖Lp(µ) ≥ ‖f‖Lp(ν)
where the first inequality is by the tensorized version of Theorem 5.5, and the last inequality
follows from pointwise application of Jensen’s inequality, as in the proof of Lemma 8.1 in
[52]: if p ∈ (0, 1) then (Sf)p ≥ S(fp) and if p < 0 then (Sf)p ≤ S(fp).
In order to derive the factorization, we define ξ := Y − E[Y |X] and observe that ξ ∼
N(0,ΣY |X) and ξ is independent of X. Using the formula for E[Y |X] in Gaussians and
ΣX = Id×d gives
Y = ΣY XX + ξ.
Also observe the following decomposition holds (a form of law of total variance)
Id×d = E[Y Y T ] = ΣY XΣXY + ΣY |X
so ΣY |X = Id×d − ΣY XΣXY . Therefore conditional on X, we have the equality in law
Y
d
= ΣY X(X +
√
αξ1) + ξ2
where ξ1 ∼ N(0, I), ξ2 ∼ N(0,ΣY |X − αΣY XΣXY ). Note that ΣY |X − αΣY XΣXY =
I − (1 +α)ΣY XΣXY  0 by the definition of α, so this is valid. Therefore conditional on X
we have the equality in law
Y
d
= ΣY X
√
1 + α(
√
1− αX +
√
α
1 + α
ξ1) + ξ2 = ΣY X
√
1 + α(e−tX +
√
1− e−2tξ1) + ξ2
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since t is defined so that 1− e−2t = α1+α . Defining Xt := e−tX +
√
1− e−2tξ1 we have from
the above decomposition of the law of Y given X that
X → Xt → Y
is a Markov chain. The Markov kernel S in our desired factorization then is given by
the conditional law of Y given Xt, since the conditional law of Xt given X matches the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process as desired.
(2). By the reverse Holder’s inequality ([11], Lemma 5.2 of [52]),
E[fK⊗ng] ≥ ‖f‖Lq‖K⊗ng‖Lq′
where q′ := qq−1 so that
1
q +
1
q′ = 1. Then the result follows by part (1) as long as
t ≥ 1
2
log
1− q′
1− p =
1
2
log
1
(1− p)(1− q) .
(3). This follows from (2) in the same way as the proof of Lemma 8.3 of [52].
5.2.2 Voters are not determined by their neighbors.
In order to apply the reverse hypercontractive estimates from the previous section, we need
to show that for any β and (X,Y ) a pair of neighboring voters that they have a positive
probability of choosing any one of the voting outcomes in NAE3 ×NAE3.
Lemma 5.7. Fix β ≥ 0. Suppose that (X,Y ) are random vectors jointly valued in NAE3×
NAE3 and distributed according to the Gibbs measure
Pr(X = x, Y = y) =
1
Z
exp (β〈x, y〉)
where Z is the normalizing constant. Then
α := min
x,y∈NAE3
Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(X = x) Pr(Y = y)
> 0.
Proof. Since probabilities are upper bounded by 1, we have
α ≥ min
x,y
Pr(X = x, Y = y) = min
x,y
exp (β〈x, y〉)∑
x′,y′ exp (β〈x, y〉)
≥ exp(−3β)
36 exp(3β)
= e−6β/36
using that |〈x, y〉| ≤ 3 and |NAE3 ×NAE3| = 36.
When applying the Invariance Principle using results from [50] we will need a bound on
the maximum correlation between the first coordinates of X1, Y1 and the second coordinates
of X2, Y2. We adopt a multi-index notation where X11 is the first coordinate of X1, X12 is
the second coordinate, etc.
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Lemma 5.8. Let β,X, Y be as defined in Lemma 5.7 and let i 6= j be elements of {1, 2, 3}.
Define the maximum correlation coefficient
ρij(β) := sup
f,g:{±1}2→R
Cov(f(X1i, Y1i), g(X1j , Y1j))√
Var(f(X1i, Y1i)) Var(g(X1j , Y1j))
.
For all β ≥ 0, ρij(β) < 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality i = 1 and j = 2. By rescaling, we can restrict to f, g
satisfying Var(f) = Var(g) = 1. After the rescaling, the set of functions we are optimiz-
ing over is compact so it suffices to show that for any particular choice of f and g that
Cov(f, g) < 1. Suppose otherwise, so Cov(f, g) = 1, then g(X12, Y12) is a deterministic
affine function of f(X11, Y11). However, from the assumption Var(g) = 1 we know that
there are two inputs to g such that it takes on different values, and from Lemma 5.7 we
know that both of those inputs have positive probability of occurring regardless of the value
of X11, Y11, so Var(g(X12, Y12)|X11, Y11) > 0. By contradiction, ρ12(β) < 1.
We also prove a strong nondegeneracy property of the joint covariance matrix which we
will need when we apply reverse hypercontractivity to moment-matched Gaussians coming
from the Invariance Principle. Informally, it expresses the fact that although there exist
nontrivial functions like NAE3(X11, X12, X13) which are constant under the Gibbs measure,
they are not linear functions of V defined in Lemma 5.9 (or multilinear functions of the
vector version defined in Lemma 5.10), which will mean that those functions essentially do
not exist when we move to the Gaussian version of the problem.
Lemma 5.9. Fix β ≥ 0 and let (X,Y ) be as defined in Lemma 5.7 so that X and Y are
correlated random vectors both valued in NAE3. Define Σ : 9×9 to be the covariance matrix
of the random vector V = (V1, V2, V3) where
Vi :=
(
Xi, Yi,
XiYi − µ
σ
)3
i=1
and where, by symmetry, µ = E[XiYi] and σ =
√
Var(XiYi) do not depend on i. Then Σ is
positive definite, i.e. Σ  0.
Proof. Just for this proof, we adopt the multi-index notation that Vij = (Vi)j . Let w be
an arbitrary vector in R9 with ‖w‖2 = 1 and indexed in the same way as V . To prove the
Theorem, it suffices to show that for every such w, Var(
∑
i,j wijVij) > 0 as this implies the
minimum eigenvalue of Σ is positive. There must exist a ∈ {1, 2, 3} and b ∈ {1, 2, 3} be
such that wab 6= 0 and without loss of generality assume that a = 1. From the law of total
variance, we have
Var(
∑
i,j
wijVij) ≥ EVar(
∑
j
w1jV1j |V2, V3) = EVar(
∑
j
w1jV1j |X2, X3, Y2, Y3).
Since all values of X,Y in NAE23 occur with positive probability by Lemma 5.7, to show
the above is positive it suffices to show that Var(
∑
j w1jV1j |X2 = 1, X3 = −1, Y2 = 1, Y3 =
−1) > 0. In this case the conditional law of X1, Y1 is such that EX1 = EY1 = 0 and
|E[X1Y1]| < 1, so the functions {1, X1, Y1, X1Y1} form a linearly independent basis for
the space of functions under this measure, hence {X1, Y1, X1Y1−µσ } must also be linearly
independent: otherwise, we could solve for X1 in terms of the other three basis elements.
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5.2.3 Proof of Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem
Equipped with the estimates derived in the previous two subsections and a general formula-
tion of the Invariance Principle [53, 50], it now becomes relatively straightforward to adapt
the proof of Quantitative Arrrow’s Theorem for independent voters developed in [51, 52].
Essentially, we just need to: 1. be careful about replacing voters by pairs of voters in
various parts of the proof: for example, in the discussion of influence and in the appeal to
the Invariance principle. 2. replace the appeal to various estimates by their replacement
given in the previous two subsections, and 3. at the end of the argument, appeal to (the
non-quantitative version of) Arrow’s Theorem to show that a constitution which is close
to a junta of two paired voters is either close to an actual dictator or has a significant
probability of paradox.
Gaussian Version We start with the proof of the Gaussian analogue. In this analogue,
the correlated random vectors V (1), V (2), V (3) defined below contain information about
the three pairwise elections between candidates. Since the Gaussian analogue corresponds
to the setting with low-influence functions (see next subsection), the dictator function is
no longer a way to avoid paradox. For technical reasons involving the reduction via the
Invariance Principle (and as in [51, 52]), this result needs to be proved for functions valued
in [−1, 1].
Lemma 5.10. Fix β > 0 and define Σ : 9× 9 as in Lemma 5.9. Suppose that V1, . . . , Vn ∼
N(0,Σ) where each Vi further decomposes as Vi = (Vi1, Vi2, Vi3) as in Lemma 5.9. For
a ∈ {1, 2, 3}, define V (a) = (Via)ni=1. Fix  > 0. There exists δ = δ() > 0 such that
at least one of the following occurs, for any f, g, h which are measurable functions from
R3n → [−1, 1]:
1. Two of the random variables f(V (1)), g(V (2)), h(V (3)) are -close to constant func-
tions of the opposite sign. Here we say f is -close to the constant function 1 if
E[f ] ≥ 1− 2.
2. The probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ:
E[NAE3(f(V (1)), g(V (2)), h(V (3)))] > 1− δ
where NAE3 : [−1, 1]3 → [0, 1] is defined to be the harmonic extension of the usual
NAE3 function; i.e. NAE3(x, y, z) =
1
4 (3− xy − yz − xz).
Proof. This follows from the proof of Theorem 11.7 in [51], except that we use the reverse
hypercontractive estimate from Lemma 5.6 instead of Lemma 2.5 of [51]; the condition
α > 0 is satisfied by Lemma 5.9 and the fact that the Schur complement of a positive
definite matrix is always positive definite.
Low (Cross-) Influence Functions. Next, we derive Arrow’s Theorem for low influence
functions using the Invariance Principle to reduce to the Gaussian case. First we state the
needed invariance principle.
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Definition 5.11. Suppose X1, . . . , Xn are i.i.d. random variables each valued in finite set
X with law P . Let e0, . . . , ek be an orthonormal basis for L
2(P ) with e0 = 1 and for a multi-
index σ define eσ =
∏
i eiσi in the usual way. The d-low-degree influence of coordinate i on
function f is defined by
I≤di (f) :=
∑
σ:|σ|≤d,σi>0
E[eσ(X)f(X)]2.
The influence of coordinate i is Ii(f) := I
≤n
i (f).
Lemma 5.12. Let  > 0 and i 6= j two distinct elements of {1, 2, 3}. Fix β ≥ 0 and
let (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn) be distributed according to the Gibbs measure (9). There exists
τ := τ(, β) > 0 such that the following is true.
Let (N1,M1), . . . , (Nn,Mn) be i.i.d. jointly Gaussian random variables drawn from
N(0,Σ) where Σ : 6× 6 is the covariance matrix of the random vector(
X1i, Y1i,
X1iY1i − µ
σ
,X1j , Y1j ,
X1jY1j − µ
σ
)
where µ = E[X1iY1i] = E[X1jY1j ], σ =
√
Var(X1iY1i) =
√
Var(X1jY1j), and with N1
corresponding to the first three coordinates and M1 the last three. Let f : {±1}2n → [−1, 1]
and g : {±1}2n → [−1, 1] be arbitrary functions such that for all 1 ≤ a ≤ n,
max
{
I≤log(1/τ)a (f), I
≤log(1/τ)
a (g)
}
< τ
where I≤da (f) is the d-low degree influence of coordinate a ∈ {1, . . . , n} on f viewed as a
function of (Xai, Yai)
n
i=1, and defined analogously for g. Then there exist functions f˜ , g˜ :
R3n → [−1, 1] such that
|E[f(X(i), Y (i))g(X(j), Y (j))]− E[f˜(N)g˜(M)]| ≤ 
where the notation X(i) denotes the vector (Xai)
n
a=1, and where f˜ is defined only in terms
of f (i.e. it is independent of the choice of g).
Proof. This follows from the argument of Theorem 11.9 of [51] (see also Lemma A.4 of [52])
by combining Lemma 5.8, Lemma 6.1 of [50], and Theorem 3.20 of [53] using hypothesis H3
there.
Lemma 5.13. For every β ≥ 0 and  > 0, there exists δ(, β), τ(, β) > 0 such that the
following result holds, where X,Y are sampled from the Gibbs measure (9). Let f, g, h :
{±1}2n → {±1} be arbitrary. Suppose that for all 1 ≤ a ≤ n, at most one of f, g, h satisfies
I
log2(1/τ)
a > τ where we view f as a function of the independent pairs (Xa1, Ya1)
n
a=1 and
similarly for g and h. Then either:
1. Two of f, g, h are 32-close to constant functions of opposite sign.
2. The probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ, i.e.
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3))) ≤ 1− δ.
Proof. The proof follows Theorem 11.11 of [51], except that the version of invariance we
use is Lemma 5.12 and the proof in the Gaussian case is Lemma 5.10.
34
Constitution with Two Influential Pairs. In the case that two pairs of voters are
both influential, there is always a significant probability of paradox.
Lemma 5.14. For every β ≥ 0 and  > 0, there exists δ(, β) such that the following result
holds, where X,Y are sampled from the Gibbs measure (9). As in the previous Lemmas,
we consider arbitrary functions f, g, h : {±1}2n and view them as functions of independent
pairs of coordinates. Suppose there exist two indices 1 ≤ a < b ≤ n and f1 6= f2 are two
distinct elements of {f, g, h} such that Ia(f1) >  and Ib(f2) > . Then the probability of
paradox is lower bounded: Pr(NAE3(f(X
1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3))) > 1− δ.
Proof. The proof follows Theorem 3.3 of [51], except that we look at pairs of voters instead
of single voters and use the general reverse hypercontractive estimate from Lemma 5.2, in
the application of which we can justify that α > 0 by appealing to Lemma 5.7.
Constitutions with One Influential Pair. In the case that only one pair in the match-
ing has large influence, we can condition on this pair to generate a situation where no pairs
are influential. This implies by the previous Lemmas that the pair is a dictator, from which
it is easy to show that a single element in the pair is the dictator.
Lemma 5.15. For every β ≥ 0 and  > 0, there exists δ(, β), τ(, β) > 0 such that
the following result holds, where X,Y are sampled from the Gibbs measure (9). As in
the previous Lemmas, we consider arbitrary functions f, g, h : {±1}2n and view them as
functions of independent pairs of coordinates. Assume that there exists 1 ≤ a ≤ n such that
for all b 6= a,
max(Ib(f), Ib(g), Ib(h)) < τ.
Then either:
1. the function (X,Y ) 7→ (f(X1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3)) is -close to a function in
F3, i.e. the constitution is -close to either being dictator or having a fixed bottom or
top candidate.
2. Or, the probability of paradox is lower-bounded, i.e.
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3))) ≥ δ.
Proof. First, we prove the result with  replaced by /4 and where in case (1) we expand
the definition so that the constitution is allowed to depend nontrivially on both voters in
the matching (i.e. those two voters form a junta). In this case, the proof follows as in
Theorem 7.1 of [51], except that we use Lemma 5.13 to handle the low-influence case after
conditioning in the argument.
Finally, if the constitution is close to constitution depending on only the two voters in
the matching indexed by a, the standard Arrow’s Theorem (see Proposition 3.1 of [51]) and
the triangle inequality can be applied to show that it either has a significant probability of
paradox (so it falls into case (2)), or it is -close to an element of F3.
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Deduction of Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem.
Theorem 5.16. For every β ≥ 0 and  > 0, there exists δ(, β) > 0 such that the follow-
ing result holds, where X,Y are sampled from the Gibbs measure (9). As in the previous
Lemmas, we consider arbitrary functions f, g, h : {±1}2n and view them as functions of
independent pairs of coordinates. Then either:
1. the function (X,Y ) 7→ (f(X1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3)) is -close to a function in
F3, i.e. the constitution is -close to either being dictator or having a fixed bottom or
top candidate.
2. Or, the probability of paradox is lower-bounded, i.e.
Pr(NAE3(f(X
1, Y 1), g(X2, Y 2), h(X3, Y 3))) ≥ δ.
Proof. This is by case analysis as in Theorem 11.14 of [51]: all constitutions fall into the
setting of one of Lemma 5.15, Lemma 5.14, or Lemma 5.13; here we use that low-degree
influences always lower bound normal influences.
6 Conclusion
Beyond the conjectures already stated, a number of interesting open problems remain. We
state a few natural questions below:
1. Supposing that Conjecture 1 is true, it’s also interesting to ask for each q about the
supremum of β(q) such that the result holds; it seems very plausible that the sharp
β(q) in general is determined by the mean-field case where G is the complete graph.
In some sense this would show that the complete graph is the “best case” for avoiding
paradox.
2. In the cases considered in this paper, pairwise majority-based elections were shown
to be threshold-optimal in the models considered with q = 3, in the sense that when-
ever Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem does not hold (i.e. Arrow’s paradox is avoidable
asymptotically almost surely), pairwise majority also avoids paradox asymptotically
almost surely. This is consistent with the following much more general hypothesis:
for any q ≥ 3, γ > 0, there exists a function δ(q, , γ) such that if elections under
pairwise majority exhibit at least an γ probability of paradox, the Quantitative Ar-
row’s Theorem also holds – either the constitution is -close to a function in Fk or
the probability of a paradox is at least δ(q, , γ) > 0. This hypothesis implies that no
other voting rule (which is far from dictator and far from constant in every pairwise
election) succeeds in avoiding paradox when pairwise majority fails. Is the hypothesis
true?
3. Conjecture 1 asks for the behavior on general graphs, but it is also interesting to
understand the sharp regime for a Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem to hold on particular
families of graphs (e.g. lattices). This is closely related to the previous two questions.
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4. In the low-temperature case (β large) and for general q, is it true that for all connected
graphs, pairwise majority avoids paradox asymptotically almost surely? If so, is the
probability of paradox always exponentially small in n?
5. What more can be said about the probability of paradox as a function of β — for
example, how does it behave if we zoom in to the critical temperature? In the case
of the perfect matching, is the minimum probability of paradox still attained at the
same point if instead of pairwise majority, we consider the optimal voting rule for
each value of β? More generally, when is the probability of paradox monotone in β?
Acknowledgements: We thank Mehtaab Sawhney and Jonathan Kelner for interesting
discussions about Conjecture 2.
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A Appendix: Deferred Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.15
Proof. By using λi = βsi and eliminating β, we see that any solution (λ1, λ2, λ3) to the
mean-field equations (Lemma 3.14) for some value of β must satisfy the three equations
λ1(sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3)− sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3))
= λ2(sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3)− sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3))
λ1(− sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3))
= λ3(sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3)− sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3))
λ2(− sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3) + sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3)
= λ3(sinh(λ1 + λ2 − λ3)− sinh(λ1 − λ2 + λ3) + sinh(−λ1 + λ2 + λ3)).
We make the change of variables
u :=
 1 1 −11 −1 1
−1 1 1
λ.
Note that this change of variables preserves the symmetry of the equations under permu-
tation of u1, u2, u3. This allows us to focus mostly on the first two equations above
u1 + u2
2
(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2) + sinh(u3)) = u1 + u3
2
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2)− sinh(u3))
u1 + u2
2
(− sinh(u1) + sinh(u2) + sinh(u3)) = u2 + u3
2
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2)− sinh(u3))
and use the third equation implicitly when arguing by symmetry. These equations are
equivalent to their sum and difference, which are:
(u1 + u2) sinh(u3) =
u1 + u2 + 2u3
2
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2)− sinh(u3)) (10)
(u1 + u2)(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2)) = u1 − u2
2
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2)− sinh(u3)). (11)
We now break into two cases:
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• Case 1: u1 = u2. Then (10) gives
2u1 sinh(u3) = (u1 + u3)(2 sinh(u1)− sinh(u3)). (12)
We plot the solution locus in Figure 3. Rearranging, the equation is 2u1 sinh(u1) +
2u3 sinh(u1) = 3 sinh(u3)u1 + u3 sinh(u3). For a fixed value of u3, since the left hand
side is strictly convex in u1 and the right hand side is linear, there exist at most
two solutions to the equation. Furthermore for u3 6= 0 the lhs is zero and the rhs
is positive, so there are exactly two solutions. One family of solutions is given by
u1 = u3, and then the other family of solutions has u1 with the opposite sign of u3.
• Case 2: u1 6= u2. We split into further subcases.
1. u1 = u3. Then the symmetrical version of (10) gives us a symmetrical version
of (12): the argument above tells us the resulting equation has a single family of
solutions where u2 has opposite sign to u1 = u3. (There would be another family
of solutions where u1 = u2 but in case 2 we have ruled out those solutions.)
2. u2 = u3. This case is symmetrical to the previous case as well, giving a single
family of solutions with u1 having opposite sign to u2 and u3.
3. u2 6= u3 and u1 6= u3. Using that u1 6= u2 and (11) lets us solve for u3:
sinh(u3) = sinh(u1) + sinh(u2)− 2(u1 + u2)(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2))
u1 − u2 . (13)
Using this (10) can be rewritten as
(u1 + u2) sinh(u3) = (u1 + u2 + 2u3)
(u1 + u2)(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2))
u1 − u2 (14)
We consider some further subcases:
(a) u1 + u2 = 0. Then (13) lets us solve to get u3 = 0.
(b) Two symmetrical cases to the previous one: u1 + u3 = 0, u2 + u3 = 0 which
have symmetrical solution families.
(c) Finally, we have the case where 0 /∈ {u1 + u2, u2 + u3, u1 + u3}. In this case
we will argue there is no solution. Dividing by u1 + u2 in (14) gives
sinh(u3) = (u1 + u2 + 2u3)
sinh(u1)− sinh(u2)
u1 − u2 . (15)
We plot the solution locus of the equation (15) (with u3 defined in terms of u1, u2
by (13), and requiring u1 6= u2) in Figure 4. The five curves which appear are
the five subcases of case 2 above (case 2.1, 2.2, 2.3.a and two in 2.3.b) so we
indeed covered all of the cases.
Assuming the accuracy of Figure 4 and changing back into the original variables, we get
the classification described in the first part of the Lemma. For the second part, it remains
to plot the objective value achieved by each of the solution families as a function of β.
Assuming the accuracy of Figure 5, we have that the solutions of the third type have the
largest objective value.
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Figure 3: Solution set in terms of u1, u3 of (12) where u2 = u1.
Figure 4: Solution set in terms of u1, u2 of (15) where u3 is determined by (13) and we
require u1 6= u2.
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Figure 5: Plot of Φ(s) for varying β and for each of the three types of solutions from
Lemma 3.15: blue is type (1), orange is type (2), green is type (3).
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Sketch of alternative analysis: Here we sketch the proof of a weaker version of
Lemma 3.15 which avoids the use of the computer-generated plots and suffices for The-
orem 3.16. The weaker result we prove is that there are no solutions to the mean field
equations from Lemma 3.14 except of the form λ1 = λ2 = λ3 where all three of λ1, λ2, λ3
have the same sign. We can check by plugging into the explicit solutions that for β > 3/4,
the solutions of with all coordinates equal (i.e. type (1) in Lemma 3.14) have smaller objec-
tive value than those of type (2) (or, of type (3) which are actually the global maximizer),
and so no maximizer of the variational problem will not have all three of λ1, λ2, λ3 with the
same sign. Therefore (using the same argument in Theorem 3.16) the law of Sn will con-
verge to a mixture of delta distributions supported on election results where the asymptotic
probability of Condorcet paradox is zero.
To prove the weaker result described above, we start from the remaining Case 2.3.c and
(13) and (15) derived previously. Substituting with (13) on the lhs of (15) and rearranging
gives
sinh(u1) + sinh(u2) = (3u1 + 3u2 + 2u3)
sinh(u1)− sinh(u2)
u1 − u2
so
u3 =
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2))(u1 − u2)
2(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2)) −
3
2
(u1 + u2).
or equivalently
2u3
u1 + u2
=
(sinh(u1) + sinh(u2))(u1 − u2)
(sinh(u1)− sinh(u2))(u1 + u2) − 3.
Define a = (u1 +u2)/2 and b = (u1−u2)/2 so u1 = a+b, u2 = a−b then since sinh(x+y) =
sinh(x) cosh(y) + cosh(x) sinh(y) the above is
u3
a
=
sinh(a) cosh(b)b
cosh(a) sinh(b)a
− 3 = tanh(a)b
tanh(b)a
− 3
i.e.
2u3
u1 + u2
=
tanh((u1 + u2)/2)
tanh((u1 − u2)/2)
u1 − u2
u1 + u2
− 3.
Define h(x) = x/ tanh(x) which is a convex even function and note the above is
2u3
u1 + u2
=
h((u1 − u2)/2)
h((u1 + u2)/2)
− 3 (16)
Using symmetry we may assume that if there exists a solution, there exists one with u1 >
u2 ≥ 0 since two out of three numbers always have the same sign. In this case we see the
rhs is strictly smaller than −2 so u3 < −u1 − u2 < −2u2. Changing back to the original
variables we have
λ =
1
2
1 1 01 0 1
0 1 1
u
and we see that λ1 > 0 while λ2, λ3 < 0. Since the orbits of such a solution under ±
symmetry and S3 always have two coordinates of one sign and one coordinate of the opposite
sign, this proves the weaker form of Lemma 3.15.
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Remark A.1. From (16) and its two symmetrical versions, we can also prove there are no
other solutions to the mean field equations (from Lemma 3.14) other than the claimed ones
if we are given the following fact about a 1-parameter family of discrete time dynamical
systems: that for all u > 0 the only points with orbits of periodicity 1 or 2 under the map
g(α) =
tanh(1+α2 u)
tanh(1−α2 u)
1− α
2
− 31 + α
2
,
i.e. solutions to (g ◦ g)(α) = α, are contained in [−1, 0]; note it’s easy to see that g(−1) = 0
and g(0) = −1. This fact also can be verified in principle by a decision theory for real
arithmetic with exponentiation [65], and seems independently interesting.
B Deferred material from Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1.3
As before we will derive the Quantitative Arrow’s Theorem from the product measure case
and a contiguity argument. First we recall the statement in the product measure setting:
Theorem B.1 (Quantitative Arrow Theorem [51]). Fix q ≥ 3. Suppose each voter votes
independently uniformly at random from S⊗nq . Fix  > 0. There exists δ = δ(, q) > 0
such that for any constitution F : Snq → {±1}(
q
2) satisfying Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA), either:
1. F is -close to a function in Fq with respect to the law of X; in particular, F is close
to being a dictator in some elections, or having some fixed pairwise elections.
2. Or, the probability of paradox is lower bounded by δ: if X is the vector of votes
drawn from the model (2), the probability that the aggregated preference vector F (X) ∈
{±1}(q2) satisfies transitivity is at most 1− δ.
Proof of Theorem 1.3. The proof follows the same strategy as in the q = 3 case, where
we reduce to the known case of product measures using a contiguity estimate. Repeating
the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.6, we will see that mutual contiguity holds for
any β such that we can prove for Xi drawn i.i.d. from the uniform measure on the image
of ϕ, Yn :=
1√
n
∑n
i=1 ϕ(Xi), and Wn := exp(
β
2 〈Yn, Yn〉) that Wn is uniformly integrable.
Following the argument of Lemma 3.2, we observe that by Lemma 4.1
max
‖u‖2=1
logE[exp(λ〈Yn, u〉)] = max‖u‖2=1n logEpi∼Sq [exp(
λ√
n
〈ϕ(pi), u〉] ≤ q − 1
2
‖λ‖22
and this implies by the Chernoff bound that
Pr(〈Yn, u〉 > (1−δ)x) ≤ min
λ≥0
e
q−1
2
λ2−λ(1−δ)x = e(1−δ)
2x2/2(q−1)−(1−δ)2x2/(q−1) = e−(1−δ)
2x2/2(q−1)
since the optimizer is λ = (1 − δ)x/(q − 1). Therefore if w = exp((β/2)x2) and N(δ) is a
δ-net of the appropriate sphere,
Pr(Wn > w) ≤ |N(δ)| exp(−(1− δ)2x2/2(q − 1)) = |N(δ)|w−(1−δ)2x2/β(q−1)
and as long as β < 1/(q−1) we can choose δ sufficiently small such that 1β(q−1)(1−δ)2 = 1+
which suffices to prove the uniform integrability estimate.
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B.2 Low-temperature behavior
In this section, we prove the model must be in its low-temperature phase for β > 3/(q+ 1)
in the sense it is not mutually contiguous to the product measure, and the limiting behavior
of 1n logZ is not an analytic extension of its high temperature behavior (i.e. it is not equal
to a constant); therefore the model must exhibit a phase transition at or before 3/(q + 1)
and the high-temperature contiguity estimate from the previous section is off by at most a
factor of (slightly less than) three. First we start with a basic eigenvalue calculation, which
was also performed in [58].
Lemma B.2. Fix a number of candidates q and let Σ = EXXT where X = ϕ(pi) for
pi ∼ Uniform(Sq). Then the eigenvalues of Σ are (q+ 1)/3 with multiplicity q− 1 and 1/3
with multiplicity (q − 1)2.
Proof. We observe first (as used in e.g. [51]) that by using symmetry and the solution of
the case q = 3 that the diagonal of Σ is all-ones and the non-zero off-diagonal entries are
−1/3 for indices of the form (for any valid k) (ij, jk) and (ij, ki) and +1/3 for indices of
the form (ij, ik) and (ij, kj).
Next, we can check that from the above description of Σ that Σ−(1/3)I = ∑qr=1(1/3)vrvTr
where (vr)ij equals 1 if i = r and equals −1 if j = r. Observe that each vector vr is an
eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 + (q − 2)/3 = (q + 1)/3. It follows that the spectrum of Σ
contains eigenvalue (q + 1)/3 with multiplicity dim(span(v1, . . . , vq)) and eigenvalue 1/3
for all remaining eigenvectors. Finally, we observe that the only linear relation among the
vectors vr is that
∑q
r=1 vr = 0: to see this is the only linear relation, observe that for any
sum of the vectors w = a1v1 + · · ·+ aq−1vq−1 that the coefficient ai can be recovered from
the fact that wiq = ai.
Theorem B.3. For any q ≥ 3 and β > 3/(q + 1), lim infn→∞ 1n(logZ)− log |Sq| > 0 and
the mean-field model is not mutually contiguous to the uniform measure.
Proof. By the Gibbs variational principle (Lemma 3.13) and by restricting the supremum
to product measures of the form P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
∏n
i=1Q(Xi) we see
logZ = sup
P
βEP [〈Yn, Yn〉] +H(P ) ≥ sup
Q
[nβ〈EQ[X],EQ[X]〉+ nH(Q)]
= nmax
s
sup
Q:EQ[X]=s
[
β‖s‖22 +H(Q)
]
Let Φ(s) be the functional in the maximization problem above; repeating the argument
from Lemma 3.14, we can rewrite maxs Φ(s) = maxλ Ψ(λ) where
Ψ(λ) =
β
2
‖s(λ)‖22 − 〈λ, s(λ)〉+ log
∑
x
e〈λ,x〉
where in the sum x ranges over the image of Sq under the embedding ϕ, and s(λ) =∑
x xe
〈λ,x〉∑
x e
〈λ,x〉 satisfies Φ(s(λ)) = Ψ(λ). As in Lemma 3.14 we have ∇λΨ(λ) = βs(λ)s′(λ) −
λts′(λ) which is zero at λ = 0, and we can compute that the Hessian at λ = 0 is given by
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βΣ2−Σ where Σ = Epi∼Sq [ϕ(pi)ϕ(pi)T ]. This has a positive eigenvalue whenever βλmax(Σ) >
1 and by Lemma B.2 we know that λmax(Σ) =
q+1
3 .
Therefore, for β > 3/(q+1) the point λ = 0 is a critical point of Ψ(λ) where the Hessian
has positive eigendirections, so the maximum of Ψ(λ) must be strictly greater than at 0.
Since Ψ(0) = log |Sq| this proves the inequality limn→∞ 1n logZ−log |Sq| > 0. In particular,
under the Gibbs measure EP [〈Yn, Yn〉] = Ω(n). Since 〈Yn, Yn〉/n is bounded, this implies
|〈Yn, Yn〉| = Ω(n) with positive probability, whereas by basic concentration estimates (e.g.
Markov’s inequality) we know this happens with probability o(1) for the product measure.
This proves the sequences of measures are not mutually contiguous.
Note in the statement we wrote lim inf just because we did not prove the limit of 1n logZ
exists. The above result proves mutual contiguity fails; it seems likely that in this regime,
as in the q = 3 case, the probability of paradox is also o(1). Proving or disproving this will
probably require understanding the solutions of the mean-field equations for all values of
q, and also perhaps finer grained (i.e. moderate deviations) behavior of the model in low
temperature.
C Deferred Material from Section 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By the central limit theorem, to understand this model it will suffice
to compute correlations in a single matching. We have
E[X1Y T1 ] =
1
Z
∑
x1,y1
eβ〈x1,y1〉x1yT1
We group the terms by 〈x1, y1〉. The possible values are 3 (all agree), 1 (1 disagreement),
−1, and 3. Therefore
E[X1Y T1 ] =
1
Z
∑
x1
x1
(
e3βxT1 + e
β(2 double agreements) + e−β(2 single agreements) + e−3β(−xT1 )
)
When x1 = (+,+,−) the contribution to the sum is
(+,+,−)(e3β(+,+,−) + eβ((−,+,−) + (+,−,−)) + e−β((+,−,+) + (−,+,+)) + e−3β(−,−,+))T
= 2(+,+,−)(sinh(3β)(+,+,−) + sinh(β)(0, 0,−2))T
= 2(1, 1,−1)(sinh(3β), sinh(3β),− sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β))T
= 2
 sinh(3β) sinh(3β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)sinh(3β) sinh(3β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)
− sinh(3β) − sinh(3β) sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β)

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Note is the same for −x1 and that there is a symmetry between the three coordinates.
Therefore summing over all the possibilities for x1 gives
4
 sinh(3β) sinh(3β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)sinh(3β) sinh(3β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)
− sinh(3β) − sinh(3β) sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β)
+ (2 symmetrical terms)
= 4
3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)− sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) 3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)
− sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) 3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β)

Since
Z = 2
∑
x1
(cosh(3β) + 2 cosh(β)) = 12(cosh(3β) + 2 cosh(β))
we see that E[X1Y T1 ] equals
1
3(cosh(3β) + 2 cosh(β))
3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)− sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) 3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β)
− sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) − sinh(3β)− 2 sinh(β) 3 sinh(3β) + 2 sinh(β)
 .
By symmetry, the marginal distribution of X1 is uniform over NAE3 so as before, it must
be that
E[X1Y T1 ] =
 1 −1/3 −1/3−1/3 1 −1/3
−1/3 −1/3 1
 .
Therefore 12E[(X1 + Y1)(X1 + Y1)
T ] equals
1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) −1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) −1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
−1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) 1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) −1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
−1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) −1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β)) 1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
 .
Finally by using the Central Limit Theorem and Lemma 3.11, it follows that the asymptotic
probability of a Condorcet winner is
3
2pi
arccos
−1/3− sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))
1 + 3 sinh(3β)+2 sinh(β)3(cosh(3β)+2 cosh(β))

as claimed.
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